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

Superpower Surrogacy and the Onset and Duration of Civil War: A Direct Empirical Test, 1947-1989

Indra de Soysa, Department of Sociology and Political Science (ISS), Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, School of Politics & International Relations, UCD

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Abstract

The bulk of social science theories explaining civil war focus on endogenous factors, generally ignoring the systemic effects of superpower rivalry during the Cold War. This study directly estimates US and Soviet rivalry by assessing the impact of CIA and KGB support to surrogates in proxy wars. Our results show that CIA support increases the risk of civil war, results that are robust to several alternative explanations and bias from endogeneity. CIA and KGB support, however, lowered the duration of wars that they may have generated, compared with other types of war, for instance ethnic wars. Superpower assistance to surrogates show a substantively large effect compared to the usual determinants of civil war, such as per capita income. It seems that ignoring systemic factors, particularly the interests of great powers only partially explain why some civil wars are more feasible than others. Proxy wars due to great power rivalry also possibly explain the bulk of current civil wars, and their lethality might be explained as the lack of restraint that the superpowers had to show to avoid a direct war between them. These results suggest that theories aimed at understanding why endogenous country conditions make civil war more feasible focus also on exogenous factors, such as great power rivalry. The question of proxiness also potentially challenges notions of commitment and time-inconsistency problems associated with explanations of why agents fail to find less costly bargains compared with fighting.

Keywords

Superpower rivalry, CIA, KGB, civil war.

Indra de Soysa is a Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway. Areas of interest: international political economy. He is a member of the Royal Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters and has served on editorial boards of leading international journals. His works are published in journals: International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, among others.

Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati is a Faculty member at the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe) University College Dublin. Areas of interests: international political economy, development politics and political economy of development in India. His works are published in journals: Journal of Development Economics, International Studies Quarterly, Oxford Economic Papers, World Development, among others. He is a board member of editorial committee of Journal of Peace Research and International Area Studies Review.

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It would be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Harry S. Truman, March 12, 1947.

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in the area should be made good … by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area. … Words alone are not enough. Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 5, 1957.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1961.

The role of the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines or Thailand or any of these countries which have internal subversion is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them. Now, that, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout the world. Richard R. Nixon, July 25, 1969.

We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Ronald R. Reagan, 1985 State of the Union address to Congress.

1. Introduction

Despite the intense study of the causes of civil war and political violence, the systemic effects of great power rivalry have not been theoretically properly identified, nor scrutinized empirically until fairly recently (Albornoz and Hauk 2014, Hironaka 2005, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The bulk of civil war studies, particularly during the Cold War, focused on structural factors, the role of ideological struggle and revolution by the masses, or ethnic minority rebellions against discrimination (Gurr 1970, Horowitz 2000, Lichbach 1989, Skocpol 1979). Many identified the lack of modernization as the problem, particularly problems associated with state making, the inability to generate economic development, the lack of democracy, and low state capacities for addressing political grievances (Huntington 1968, Olson 1963, Tilly 1985). While overt and covert superpower support in these civil wars, such as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and several other sites around the globe are glaring examples, the general effect of the Cold War rivalry rarely enter analyses centrally. Indeed, US policymakers are sometime portrayed as hapless victims in search of stability (Kissinger 1959). American diplomatic historians, on the other hand, have focused directly on the foreign policy actions of the US and the

USSR in terms of how they instigated, sustained, and often ended Third World wars (Gaddis 1997, Jones 2001, LaFeber 1983, Westad 2007). While many acknowledge the role of proxy wars during the civil war, no one has directly tested the impact of superpower surrogacy on the onset and duration of civil wars. We examine this issue using unique data on superpower support to surrogates.

Using recently-collected data on covert and overt support from the United States´ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United Soviet Socialist Republics´ (USSR) primary intelligence agency, the KGB, in standard models of civil war, we find that successful CIA support to a government increased the risk of a civil war onset, controlling for a host of independent variables. The results are not just statistically significant but show relatively large substantive effects. These results are also robust to instrumental variables analysis that address concerns of endogeneity. CIA surrogacy, however, lead to shorter wars, compared to other kinds of wars, such as ethnic wars and sons of the soil conflicts. Our results also show that superpower surrogates won the vast majority of struggles against rebels, which calls into question some claims suggesting that "robust insurgency" favoured rebels (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The results, taken together, support many claims about the influence of the superpowers for making civil war feasible, but their involvement directly may have led to shorter wars, possibly due to greater government capacity against rebels.

2. Theory: The international system and superpower rivalry

Structural realists pin their analyses of international relations on the configuration of power in the global system (Waltz 2001). These scholars, though preoccupied with great powers politics and questions of interstate war, focus on system polarity as a defining factor explaining interstate behaviour related to the search for security and relative advantage vis-à-vis other powers through geopolitical struggle, alliance politics, and the peddling of influence. The Cold War period of extreme bipolarity is generally thought of as being special. This bipolar world began immediately following the end of World War II, lasting roughly 40 years and is characterised by intense superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, explained simply as the natural outcome of a bipolar concentration of power in the international system (Waltz 2000). Indeed, Marquis Alexis de Tocqueville, predicted the Cold War almost two hundred years before by writing:

> "There are now two great nations in the world…the Russians and the Anglo-Americans…Each seems called by some secret design of providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world" (Cited in Gaddis 1997: 1).

The "secret design of providence" de Tocqueville refers to is possibly his astute assessment of the power that these two countries would one day muster judging simply by their enormous geographical size, potential population growth, and access to natural resources; i.e. the ingredients of economic and military power.

Alexis de Tocqueville´s prophecy came to pass when the wartime alliance between the US and the USSR broke down immediately following the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. In effect, the US and the USSR emerged as the two most powerful states based on military might and productive capacity. Given the devastation of Europe and the threat of Soviet

expansion, the US could not retreat into isolationism, as it had done after the First World War. Inevitably, the US designs for the post-war global order clashed with the Soviet vision, a clash that had simply remained dormant during the war years, but one that could be traced to the fundamental antipathies between the US´s liberal vision of a world order and the Soviet vision premised on World revolution, now steered by a mistrustful Stalin that hoped to bring security to the USSR by annexing territory (Gaddis 1997). As Westad (2007) notes, superpower rivalry was also driven by underlying sympathies within both camps for extending their own versions of modernity to other nations throughout the world. According to many historians, thus, the Cold war represents a struggle for 'world domination' by two superpowers, who now each possessed nuclear weapons that could have destroyed the planet in any potential direct armed confrontation (Brodie 1973, Snow 1987). The fact that the Cold War ended without a major power war has led some to refer to this period as the "long peace", but the rest of the world was hardly peaceful, nor spared the effects of superpower struggle (David 1997, Gaddis 1989). Unable to fight each other directly because of mutual assured destruction (MAD), the superpowers fought "proxy wars" throughout the world, often by directly intervening with troops and by actively supporting one or another´s side with material assistance (Mumford 2013, Snow 1996).

Reluctant to confront the USSR militarily, the US adopted a strategy of containment based on the advice of the long-time Soviet expert George F. Kennan, who advised the administration in the infamous "long telegram" to Washington to draw a line in the sand and resist further Soviet expansion outside its sphere of influence. The fall of China to communism and the Korean war highlighted the need for resisting communist aggression across the world, even to try to "roll back" communist influence where it had taken root. The US saw communist infiltration as a major threat to national security because poor, premodern societies around the world were thought to be vulnerable to communist propaganda, and these nations, particularly in Latin America, South East Asia and Africa were expected to fall like dominoes. The domino theory in turn provoked the US to act to fight communist/Soviet expansion everywhere vigorously, because failure to act in one location meant its inevitable spread to others (Jones 2001, Westad 2007). An extremely distrustful Soviet leadership saw US actions in the same way that the US viewed the Soviets, as expansionist and hostile to communism. As Westad 2007: 72) writes:

> By the early 1960s, Soviet ideology had already reached a stage where the competition for influence in the Third World was an essential part of the existence of socialism … The Soviet Union´s role was to help make the world safe for revolution.

Indeed, the Cold War led to the development of elaborate security apparatuses in both countries, geared to fight an existential struggle, spanning the globe (Westad 2007).[1] By the time President Eisenhower left office, he was to warn of a military-industrial complex

[1] For excellent recent histories of the activities of the CIA, see Kinzer, Stephen. 2013. *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles*, *Alan Dulles*, *and Their Secret World War*. New York: Times Books, Prados, John. 2006. *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the Cia*. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, Weiner, Tim. 2007. *The Legacy of Ashes: The History of the Cia*. New York: Doubleday.

driving US foreign policy because of the arms race that had developed and the fear that escalation of tensions would make war between the superpowers inevitable. The presidential doctrines quoted at the outset of the paper, covering Truman to Reagan are illustrative of the commitment of US administrations to fighting the Soviet threat. To what extent, therefore, did the mighty struggle between the superpowers, which was the Cold War, affect the onsets and duration of civil wars around the world?

2.1 The empirics of civil war

Looking simply at the trend in the incidence and onsets of civil wars is illustrative because we can try to account for the temporal and spatial patterns to clue us about factors that may drive them. The past few decades have seen a noticeable decline of violence, accentuated sharply since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Gleditsch 2008). Figure 1 displays the trends in conflicts, where at least 25 deaths have occurred in a single year between 1946 and 2014.

Figure 1.



Source: UCDP (2016) armed conflict incidence an onset determined at 25 battle deaths and above.

Clearly, something about the Cold War era mattered. As more countries gradually entered the international system as independent entities after the end of World War II, there was commensurately a steady increase in the risk of civil war. This trend is replicated by data that use different battle-death thresholds to identify wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014). The risk peaked around 1990-1991 and thereafter declined sharply. This peak is often explained as the sudden onsets of "end of empire" wars with the dissolution of the USSR (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). However, the two lines at the bottom of the figure show that onsets of civil war during and after the Cold War seem fairly uniform. This temporal pattern, while suggesting that the Cold War mattered, allows

somewhat limited analytical traction, but geographical variation might reveal more. Figure 2, shows the regional trends in civil war since World War II. As seen there,

Figure 2.



Source: UCDP (2016) armed conflict incidence an onset determined at 25 battle deaths and above.

The most noticeable drop in the risk of civil war since 1990 has been in Latin America. East and South East Asia region, which had the highest risk in the early days of the Cold War has also declined. Indeed, Latin America and East and South East Asia were hot superpower battle grounds and several of the countries in these regions hosted US and Soviet bases, surrogate states of both superpowers and even hosted wars in which the superpowers directly intervened. Almost all regions have seen declines, albeit not as dramatically as in Latin America, except for North Africa and Middle East (MENA), which has had a relatively high but steady risk throughout the Cold War period, but it suddenly rises steeply since 2001. Again, this highly stylized view from the trend data suggest something about the importance of great power politics as it affects the systemic risk of civil war because why the MENA region should see such a massive increase the year following the US´s war on terror following the 9/11 attacks cannot just be coincidental.

Paul Collier, as the head of the World Bank´s development research section, generated some of the most widely-cited studies on civil war (Collier and Sambanis 2005, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 2001). This research demonstrated that civil wars get generated because the "feasibility" of financing violence, not because of widely-shared grievances in a population. Rebels formed armies because of poverty and because they had access to finances from natural resources, for example. Others confirmed these findings, arguing that what matters was not poverty per se, but that low incomes also meant weak states that are easily targeted by armed groups (Fearon and

Laitin 2003). These studies explicitly focused on endogenous factors. Later, the flagship publication of the World Bank focused on poverty largely harped on good governance as a conflict avoiding strategy, focusing on institutions for reducing vulnerability to conflict. These studies generally did not find any difference between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era, in spite of the fact that these studies also reported that previous conflicts—which had to have taken place during the Cold War—was one of the strongest predictors of new conflicts. These results were generally explained as the effects of the accumulation of "conflict-specific capital" (Collier et al. 2003). Surely then, the Cold War era might have mattered, even for generating some of the wars still going on (Westad 2007).

Others too have argued that endogenous factors alone might be fairly poor at explaining why civil war occurs (Gleditsch 2007, Gleditsch et al. 2010). Many of these studies correctly point out that conflicts may cluster in space, spill over borders, cut-across ethnic and political groups that straddle borders, and be supported and sustained by transnational sources of finance, including factors relating to interdependencies among rebel groups. Recently, at least two sets of studies have looked directly at Cold War factors for explain civil war. The first looks at how partisan politics in the United States drive civil war (Albornoz and Hauk 2014). Albornoz and Hauk argue that Republican US presidents were more likely to be hawkish and intervene in civil war, particularly when their popularity was low. They show statistical evidence in support of their proposition, and as additional tests, they use CIA interventions as an instrument to capture Republican effects and avoid endogeneity bias. However, if CIA interventions directly cause civil war, then it's an invalid instrument for Republican presidents. We do not directly address this issue but suggest only that to think that superpower rivalry is an artefact of US domestic politics rather than the other way around does considerable violence to history.

Others look at the Cold War era to explain the changing nature of warfare (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). They argue that during the Cold War, insurgents and governments were bolstered by superpower support, which led to robust insurgency, characterized as fairly large formation irregular war, supported by masses of people—the so-called "peoples wars." They argue that these wars often led to rebel victories because the technology of "robust insurgency" favoured the irregular war that favoured rebels. States, they argue, often win against primitive rebellions, which are characterized by loosely-organized bands of insurgents that are able to take advantage of rough terrain and hit-and-run tactics. Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) suggest that such wars are often won by states. Their main argument about the post-Cold War era is that absent Cold War support, states and rebels are symmetrically balanced, leading to more conventional war in recent times. Their major contention is that by studying the "technology" of war, we could understand more about the micro processes that allow it to occur. However, there is an equally compelling argument to be made that specific technology adopted in a war reflects constraints and opportunities for fighting rather than micro processes that may help us better understand why civil wars exist in some places rather than others. In other words, the particular technology of warfighting that is adopted is likely to be determined by material capabilities, or factors that make war feasible. For example, if looting diamonds is what motivates and sustains you, you are likelier to target civilians and get them out of the way.

Take for example the so-called ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, which started off in the mid to late 1970s with violence breaking out among several rival Tamil rebel groups, which fought each other and the state for supremacy and the allegiance of the Tamil population. Out of several rebel groups, many of them sworn enemies of the others, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under the leadership of Vellupillai Prabakharan gained supremacy, largely due to training and funding received from the Indian government and the regional government of Tamil Nadu (Narayan Swamy 2010). The LTTE used hit and run tactics against a weak Sri Lankan military and survived narrowly by avoiding defeat for decades, slowly building up a base of off shore funding by taxing the Tamil diaspora abroad and acquiring legal and illegal businesses.[2] After 20 years, the group emerged as a major conventional force, commanding finances of almost 350 million dollars in revenue per year, and even defeating the Sri Lankan army in several conventional pitched battles. Yet, in May 2009, after several rounds of failed negotiations, the LTTE was decisively beaten on the battle field, and its entire leadership either killed or captured in the space of a few months. Why? In this case, by simply studying the changing technology of war fighting, it is not clear how an extremely astute Prabakharan, who built up one of the most formidable rebel armies the world has seen to date and survived 30 years of war, would face such a crushing defeat in a few months. Nor is it clear where the lessons of war fighting reveals about micro processes. Why was a successful technology suddenly proven wanting? It is also unclear why knowing how the war was fought tell us much about its origins, or the motivations of people that did not join the movement, or why some of the LTTE´s forces defected to the state, or other micro-processes of value? One very strong plausible reason for the defeat of the LTTE after 9/11 was simply how international systemic factors and great power politics of the region turned against the LTTE and made sustained war making difficult.

We approach the Cold War´s effects in a similar light, from the point of view of how superpower struggle increased the feasibility of groups to organize violence. Rebels and states face endogenous and exogenous, or systemic constrains for initiating and sustaining war. The European peace in the post-War years might not be explained only because the issues that drove civil wars in Europe had suddenly dissipated, but rather as a direct result of the hegemony of the United States, in its own sphere of influence, and the Soviet Union, in its own sphere of influence. Superpower rivalry elsewhere provide ample room for further understanding how small wars got generated and sustained over long periods of time. The decline of organized violence in the post-Cold War world may not mean that external factors matter less in this era, but our argument is that absent superpower rivalry, the enabling environment for civil wars, although diminished, may also increase space for other powers, such as India, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, not to mention powerful non-state actors, to fill systemic vacuums and further geopolitical interests by supporting proxy wars. These post-Cold war conflicts might also be more violent and chaotic simply because of the absence of the moderating influence of superpowers.

Superpower rivalry & proxy war theory

The World Bank studies of the causes of civil war generated a number of valuable insights that pushed the envelope on our understanding of why some countries suffer civil war

[2] Prabakharan narrowly escaped capture on two occasions by fleeing to India, where he was even jailed for a brief period.

while others avoid them. While for the World Bank studies, looting natural resource wealth provide both the motive and opportunity for rebellion, we look at how superpower rivalry might have made conflict more feasible. We examine to what extent this mattered by focusing on the idea of proxy war. Much like natural resource rents captured by rebels and governments for fighting wars, geopolitical rents from superpowers are likely to have been as attractive.

The Oxford Living Dictionary online (OLD) defines a proxy war as "a war instigated by a major power which does not itself become involved."[3] Indeed, all the "example sentences" provided by OLD relate to the Cold War funding of civil wars by the two superpowers. Andrew Mumford (2013: 11) writes,

> "Proxy wars are the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome…in short, proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare."

A proxy war thus is a war fought at the behest of a third party. It is hard to imagine, thus, that the Cold War strategic struggles between the two superpowers would not have had an influence on almost all countries decolonizing from former empires, or that political rivals jostling for power were unlikely to tap into sources of support from outside. Indeed, many leaders of countries, such as Israel and Egypt, switched sides at one time or another based, not on ideological commitment to one side or the other, but on expected support. It is undeniable that several conflicts were begun directly by the Superpowers, such as the US´s funding of the Contra rebels against the Soviet-backed *Sandanista* regime in Nicaragua, or the CIA´s support for the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan. The CIA and the KGB were also actively seeking to destabilize each other´s proxy regimes in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Given this situation, one needs also to ask whether rebels might have appeared in some places without the knowledge that a potential patron might be interested in your cause.

As an example, Vellupilai Prabakharan was initially strongly Marxist before he became a committed ethnic separatist, possibly as a way to attract Soviet attention since the then Sri Lankan government flirted with the idea of offering the port at Trincomalee to the US navy (Narayan Swamy 2010). Clearly, knowing if a superpower might support you is endogenous to the decision to rebel. We argue thus that the availability of superpower support reduced the incentives for domestic bargains and lowered the cost of fighting over negotiating. In other words, when superpower support is available to any one of the two contending parties, both parties have an incentive to renege on promises and avoid their commitments.

One interesting issue around proxy wars is that even if the some of the central issues are related directly to the warring parties, such as the desire for more political rights, or ethnic emancipation, the paymasters are able by and large to pull the strings of these wars. Since great powers can simply use their financial and political muscle, they can in many instances pull the plug on fighting. For example, Morton Halperin, writing in 1963, argued that "local wars" involving the superpowers did not have the potential to escalate

[3] See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/proxy_war (accessed 15, January 2017).

into all-out war because the US and Soviets had extremely limited aims for a number of reasons. He suggested 4 main reasons for why superpower proxy wars remain limited. First, both powers had fairly limited foreign policy interests in the countries that required their assistance. Secondly, they had a mutual desire to avoid nuclear confrontation, for avoiding a regional or global conflagration over a distant war. Third, both parties understood the role of force; they both subscribed to the idea that fighting must be limited, for limited aims, so as to avoid escalation, and fourthly, the domestic aims of the two countries and the public sentiment were directed at avoiding war. Could this, rather than other factors, explain shorter duration of wars during the Cold War, which some suggest might have been due to rebel defeat of governments as a result of robust insurgency? (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014). We address these questions directly with data that tell us the extent of superpower covert and overt intervention abroad during the Cold War years. First, we examine to what extent support to a state by the CIA of the US and the KGB of the USSR predict the onset of civil war, and secondly, we assess to what extent they sustained the duration of the wars they provoked.

3. Data and Methods

3.1. Civil war onset

We use panel data on 158 countries (see Appendix 1 for list of countries) for the Cold War period 1946–1990 (46 years).[4] Since some of the data (on control variables) are not available for all countries for all years, our dataset is unbalanced. We estimate the probability of an outbreak of civil war ***i*** in country ***c*** in year ***t*** as:

$$P(onset_{ict} = 1) = \phi_c + \beta CIA_{ct} + \beta Z_{ct} + \lambda_t + \omega_{ct} \qquad (1)$$

Wherein, $onset_{ict}$ is a discrete variable taking the value 1 if country ***c*** in year ***t*** has civil war onset ***i*** and 0 otherwise. A civil war is an armed contest between a state and an organized rebel groups. Our civil war onset variable has a relatively low inclusion criterion with 25 battle-related deaths during a year and includes wars where external troops are involved.[5] Thus, our civil wars measure captures conflict beginning at the lowest levels. The data is sourced from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

To examine whether superpower rivalry during the Cold War promoted civil wars, we use two dichotomous measures capturing the idea of superpower intervention. The standard way of studying intervention is by looking at whether a super power intervened with troops and material assistance in an ongoing conflict, designed to assess the impact of interventions on the duration of conflicts (Regan 2002). As discussed above, proxy wars can be fought without direct intervention (Mumford 2013). Therefore, we use a measure that looks specifically at overt and covert support through the main intelligence agencies of the US and the USSR. These data are sourced from Berger et al. (2013a, 2013b), who use recently declassified information and material from the Library of US Congress Country Studies to code whether a country received support from the CIA and whether a

[4] See appendix 1 for list of countries.

[5] In robustness tests, we estimate the Correlates of War 1000 battle-related deaths capturing only high intensity conflicts.

government was a surrogate of the CIA (deliberately installed with support). They also use information from Andrew and Mitrokhin (2000, 2005) to code KGB support for governments. These data capture successful intervention in that one or another side has to be directly supporting a regime in control of a country.

The data on CIA interventions capture two important aspects of support; namely, whether a government had been installed by the CIA (and continued to be supported by it) and whether a government simply received support from the CIA. For the lack of a better word, we term the variable capturing both aspects of CIA support as ***CIA intervention,*** which is coded 1 if country ***c*** in year ***t*** witnessed a CIA intervention that brought in a surrogate government and then extended it support, or if the CIA overtly and covertly supported an existing government. The country ***c*** therefore continues to receive the value 1 as long as it enjoys support from the CIA. The ***KGB intervention*** dummy variable is similarly coded, but unfortunately the information on whether a country´s government is installed by the KGB is not coded separately.[6] In other words, a country receiving KGB aid is simply assumed to be a surrogate.

The CIA used various methods to install a leader favourable to the US, such as through coups, and then continued to support that regime. Support came in the form of financial resources, military and intelligence support, direct involvement in insurgency and counterinsurgency military operations, and sabotage of physical infrastructure, which could affects the operations of opposition groups etc. (Berger et al. 2013). The variable ***CIA intervention*** takes the value of 1 if a new regime is installed in country ***c*** in year ***t*** with the backing of the CIA and 0 if not. The country ***c*** continues to receive the value of 1 for subsequent years after a surrogate regime is installed and continues to receive support from the CIA. Likewise, ***CIA support*** takes the value of 1 if an already existing regime in country ***c*** from year ***t*** onwards receives CIA support and 0 otherwise.[7] For example, declassified information reveals heavy involvement of the CIA in instigating and funding the coup in Bolivia in 1964. The newly installed regime continued to receive the support of the CIA until 1978. Thus, our CIA surrogate measure takes the value 1 for Bolivia from 1964 to 1978 and 0 for all other years.

One limitation of the data, as noted by Berger et al. (2013a, 2013b), is that it does not capture all types of CIA involvements, for example direct assistance to rebel groups or assistance to rebels via third parties. The data specifically captures only those interventions which support a regime. Thus, in spite of CIA support to the rebel group, Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, this country is coded as a KGB surrogate. Therefore, the data allow us to address the specific question of how support from the CIA or the KGB help or hurt the cause of peace in those countries in which the governments are clearly surrogates of one or the other superpowers. Our assumption is that each side would have tried to destabilize the surrogates of the other. Capturing the relative effect of this dynamic, therefore, allows us to understand the importance of superpower rivalry relative to other factors that ostensibly drove conflict during the Cold War.

[6] Appendix 2 lists all countries and the periods of CIA and KGB surrogacy.

[7] For more detailed description of data and how the information was collected and compiled, see: Berger et al. (2013a, 2013b).



Figure 3 captures the number of CIA and KGB interventions in any given year. Notice that CIA interventions increase gradually over time, peaking at the end of the Vietnam by about the end of the Vietnam involvement and then gradually decreases in a bell curve shape. For instance, in 1947, the CIA supported only 10 regimes across the world which peaked at 33 countries in 1973. The downward trend after 1973 can be explained simply as the reassertion of congressional authority over presidential support for counterinsurgency abroad after the Vietnam debacle. The KGB interventions were far fewer and relatively flat until the late 1960s which saw a marginal increase in their activity to 15 countries in 1980. The figure also tells us that the reach and success of CIA interventions were far higher than that of the KGB. In other words, the US seems to have been more interventionist. In fact, during the 1946-1989 period, the CIA was present in 51 countries (24 countries with surrogate governments; 31 countries receiving support) compared to 24 countries total in which KGB interventions were successful.

Next, we turn to our estimating strategy of multivariate models explaining the onset and duration of civil war. The vector $\boldsymbol{Z_{ct}}$ includes potential determinants of civil war onset gleaned from the existing literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010). We also avoid the "garbage can" approach and limit our control variables to the fewest possible to obtain more easily interpretable results (Achen 2005, Schrodt 2014). First, we include per capita GDP in 2010 constant US $, which is taken from Berger et al (2013). Income per capita is a 'catch all' variable for other factors, such as better institutions, the opportunity costs of rebellion, as well as state capacity. Income is considered one of the most robust predictors of civil war together with population size (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010). Thus, we control for country size logged to reduce skewness and is also from Berger et al. (2013).

Next, we control for regime type using the Polity IV index of democracy which measures regime type along a scale of -10 (strict autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) (Gurr and Jaggers 1995).[8]

Following others, we also include a measure of ethnic fractionalization, often used as a probabilistic measure of the potential for violence because of ethnic antagonisms (Fearon 2003). We also include a measure of oil wealth because of arguments about how natural resource wealth may incite violence through state capacity and other channelsFollowing Fearon and Laitin (2003), we construct a discrete variable taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed 1/3rd of total exports and 0 otherwise (World Bank 2015). Finally, we include a count of peace years, which is the number of years a country has been at peace since the last conflict along with three natural cubic splines to model the long-run effect of peace on subsequent peace. The descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 3 and details on data and sources in Appendix 4.

We use a logit estimator with heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors due to the binary nature of our dependent variable. One drawback of the logit method is that we cannot include country-fixed effects for two reasons. First, the use of two-way fixed effects will be co-linear with time-invariant regressors (Beck 2001). Variables, such as CIA surrogacy do not vary over time for many countries, and many countries do not vary on the dependent variable, which means they would be dropped automatically. Secondly, including two-way fixed effects in non-linear estimations, like the logit estimator, may be problematic *due* to the well-known *incidental parameter problem* (Wooldridge 2002). The standard approach is a conditional logit method developed by Chamberlain (1992) which allows controlling for fixed effects by maximising the conditional likelihood function as:

$$L = \Pi_{i=1}^{N} \quad P(y_{i1}, \ldots . y_{iT} \mid \sum_{i=1}^{T} y_{it})$$

Wherein, ***T*** is the last observation for country ***i***. However, the conditional logit fixed effects estimator is also has drawbacks (Chamberlain 1992). The first problem is that it estimates the 1s and 0s for each country conditioned on the total number of 1s for each country. Thus, if country ***i*** never has an onset (of 1s) or reports onset events (i.e., 1s) for every year within a country then the conditional probability of observing the data for country ***i*** is 1, which means that country ***i*** is automatically dropped from the analysis. Therefore, when estimating conditional logit fixed effects, roughly 41% of the total observations are lost. Secondly, unlike a simple univariate logit estimator, the coefficients from conditional logit fixed effects are hard to interpret because it does not allow the computation of marginal effects, making it difficult to examine substantive effects for assessing relative impacts. To circumvent these problems, we use the Probit random effects estimator developed by Chamberlain (1992). As a further robustness check, we also estimate logit models in which we control for regional dummies along with time fixed effects, thereby coming close to capturing the benefits of a fixed effects model.[9]

[8] Though the Polity IV index captures three important elements of democracy; namely, presence of institutions, existence of effective constraints on the executive and participation by citizens in the political process. In robustness checks, we also use other measures prominent in the literature.

[9] Results from the probit random effects estimator and logit estimator with geographic regional dummies are provided in the online appendix.

3.2. Endogeneity

Our CIA-intervention and CIA-support measures could be affected by endogeneity problems if CIA intervention, for example, is an outcome rather than cause of civil war onsets. Furthermore, CIA interventions maybe caused by other unmeasured factors, such as weak state capacity, which may also explain the onset of a civil war. Failing to account for endogeneity, thus, might yield biased results. To deal with this issue we use two instruments that explain CIA interventions but cannot be explained by conflict onsets. First, the development aid literature finds that countries geographically closer to the US receive more aid, reflecting weaker interest in more distant countries for self-interested strategic reasons as well as due to problems associated with administrative reach (Neumayer 2003, Stone 2010). Extending the same analogy to CIA surrogacy, we expect that countries which are closer to the US would get greater support from the CIA. We measure *inverse distance* in miles between each country's capital city to Washington D.C. Second, we use percentage share of neighbouring countries of country ***i*** that receives KGB support to capture CIA interventions. Indeed previous studies report that countries important to US security and those threatened by neighbouring states espousing communist ideology and/or rogue regimes are more likely to receive US civilian aid and military assistance (Lai 2003). Taken together, we believe that CIA interventions will be more likely in countries, which are geographically closer to the US and are threatened by the presence of pro-Soviet governments in neighbouring countries, which essentially describes the US´s containment policy and interventions in Latin America.[10] We employ the *ivprobit* estimator including all the control variables discussed above along with time fixed effects. We compute a Wald test for assessing the exogeneity of the instrumented variables.

The validity of the instrument depends on two conditions. The first issue is instrument relevance, which is that the instruments must be correlated with the explanatory variable in question – otherwise it has no power. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) suggest examining the F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression. The selected instrument would be relevant when the first stage regression model's F-statistics is above 10 (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995). We estimate the first step regressions using the logit maximum-likelihood estimator to assess the relevance of the selected instruments. The results are reported in an online appendix (Table A). We do find a strong positive effect of our instruments on CIA interventions, which are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Secondly, the selected instruments should not vary systematically with the disturbance term in the second stage equation, i.e. $\left[\omega_{it} \mid IV_{it}\right] = 0$. This means that the instrument cannot directly determine the outcome variable. We test for instrument exclusion criteria by regressing civil war onset on both instruments and including all the control variables using the logit estimator. We also control for time specific dummies. We find no evidence that our selected instruments cause an outbreak of civil war onset in country *i*. These results are reported in the online appendix (Table B). With these tests, we are confident that our analyses are not affected by the weak instrument problem.

[10] Note that our IV results remain robust even if we employ alternative set of instruments which are discussed in the robustness checks and the results are provided in online appendix.

3.3. Conflict duration

Our dependent variable for these analyses is conflict duration during the Cold War period (1946-1989). Conflict duration is the years of conflict after an onset until at least a 1-year hiatus in fighting is recorded for coding a conflict end. We also use the 5-year peace period to make sure that we do not over count short wars. We use the same conflict onset data as described above. Thus, our unit of analysis here is conflict ID-year.[11] The duration of conflicts during 1946-1989 period ranges from a low of one year to a maximum of 42 years. In selecting the potential determinants of duration of civil war we follow similar studies (Collier and Söderbom 2008, Fearon 2004, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, Lujala 2010). Once again, we keep our selection of control variables as close to Fearon's (2004) models as possible, using his measure of "sons of the soil conflicts" to gauge the relative importance of Cold War rivalry captured by the CIA and KGB variables.

Fearon´s (2004) finds strong support for the proposition that the longest civil wars in the system are driven by "sons-of-the-soil" conflicts. He characterizes a "sons of the soil" war as:

> "the civil war involves an insurgent band fighting on behalf of an ethnic minority on the periphery of a state dominated by another ethnic group; against the state's military or paramilitary formations, and/or members of the majority group who have settled as farmers in the minority group's declared home area; and involves either land conflict with migrants from the dominant group or conflict over profits and control of fuel or mineral resources in the minority's home area" (Fearon 2004: 283).

Using the information from Fearon (2004), we also code a dummy variable if a civil war in country ***i*** is considered an ethnic war and 0 otherwise. Ethnic wars are apparently harder to resolve and therefore last longer (Sambanis 2001). Likewise, following the information provided by Fearon (2004), we dummy code a variable if a civil war in country ***i*** has emerged out of a military coup or revolution, which tend to be shorter. The details on data and sources are in Appendix 4.

The Weibull model is the workhorse of duration studies (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009, Fearon 2004, Lujala 2010). In a parametric Weibull model in which the hazard rate at time ***t*** is:

$$h(t) = p\,\lambda\,t^{(p-1)} \qquad (2)$$

Wherein, $\lambda = \exp(X\beta)$ where X is the vector of independent variables and ρ is an ancillary shape parameter that shows how the hazard changes over time. A value of $\rho < 1$ indicates a declining hazard over time. We use the Weibull estimator because the results in hazard ratio form can be compared to the Cox proportionate hazard model to

[11] Wars ongoing in 1989 are right-censored.

corroborate the accuracy of coefficients. Furthermore, the Akaike Information Criteria[12] preferred the Weibull over the log-logistic survival model.[13]

4. Results

Table 1 reports the impact of CIA interventions on civil war onsets. While columns 1-2 present the results of CIA and KGB intervention together, columns 3-12 introduce several relevant control variables gleaned from widely-cited studies in a step-wise manner. Table 2 captures the results using the disaggregated measures of CIA support where we separate out the effects of support to a government from support to a surrogate government. Table 3 presents the IV Probit estimator to address endogeneity concerns. Finally, Table 4 and 5 present results on CIA and KGB interventions on the duration of war using Weibull duration models.

Table 1: CIA and KGB intervention and Civil war onset

	(1) onset1	(2) onset1	(3) onset1	(4) onset1	(5) onset1	(6) onset1	(7) onset1
CIA intervention t-1	0.31*	0.30	0.38**	0.45**	0.44**	0.51***	0.49***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
KGB Intervention t-1		-0.13	-0.18	-0.07	-0.07	0.09	0.11
		(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.35)
log Income per capita t-1			-0.49***	-0.52***	-0.48***	-0.38***	-0.45***
			(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Polity (regime type) t-1				0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log Population Size t-1					0.27***	0.28***	0.27***
					(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ethnic fractionalization t-1						1.23***	1.14***
						(0.33)	(0.33)
Oil exporter t-1							0.38
							(0.32)
Constant	-1.77***	-1.75***	1.74**	2.05**	-0.86	-2.51*	-1.95
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.83)	(1.03)	(1.13)	(1.35)	(1.31)
Countries	152	152	150	143	143	143	143
Observations	4,762	4,762	4,611	4,472	4,472	4,472	4,471

Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
(3) Logit estimator reports coefficients
(4) Peace years & 3 natural cubic splines estimated in all tests

[12]The AIC=-2(LL)+2(c+p+1) where c is the number of covariates in a model and p is the number of model specific ancillary parameters. The lowest yielding AIC value is the most preferred model.

[13] Note that we also estimate a log-logistic survival model and the Cox proportional hazards model in robustness checks. Our results are similar across estimations. These robustness checks are available in online appendix.

As seen in column 1, CIA intervention is associated positively with the outbreak of civil war, a result that is statistically significant at the 10% level. Notice that the table reports coefficients instead of odds ratio or marginal effects. The odds ratio suggests that CIA support increases the risk of a civil war outbreak by roughly 36% compared with no CIA support. Interestingly, adding KGB support in column 2 leaves both variables statistically insignificant. This is not surprising given that we do not think, for example, that stability would be compromised among the richer surrogates of the superpowers. To fully evaluate the effects of CIA and KGB interventions, we also need to control for other important factors that are likely to influence the risk of civil war outbreak, since some of them, such as income and country size, may mask any CIA and KGB effects on the risk of civil war.

As seen in column 3, when including only per capita income (log), the effect of CIA support retains its sign, and is now statistical significant at the 5% level. Substantively, having CIA support increases the risk of civil war outbreak by 46% compared with countries that do not get CIA support, independently of per capita income and KGB support. Comparing the substantive effects, increasing income by a standard deviation decreases the chance of civil war occurrence by roughly 43%, which suggests that the relative effect of CIA support is not negligible. Next, we add a measure of democracy (column 4), which does not affect the positive and significant effect of CIA support. The effect of democracy is statistically not significant. The result on democracy is robust to the use of an alternative measure of democracy (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010).[14]

In column 5, we control for population size, and in column 6 we enter Fearon´s measure of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon 2003). As seen there, both population size and ethnic fractionalization are correlated positively with an increased risk of an onset of civil war. Our results are consistent with others who report a robust positive effect between population size and civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010). Like Hegre and Sambanis (2006), we find that ethnic fractionalization matters only when testing civil war onsets using the lower battle-death threshold. The statistical significance of ethnic fractionalization no longer holds when the 1000 death threshold is used.[15] Holding other variables constant at their mean, an increase in the average value of ethnic fractionalization (0.44) by one standard deviation (0.27) increases the average risk of civil war outbreak by roughly 39%. In comparison, a country with CIA support raises the risk of an onset of civil war by roughly 67%, which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. In column 7, we enter the variable measuring oil export dependence, which has no significant impact on the onset of civil war in this model, but the result on CIA support holds. The results in Table 1, across the columns taken together, suggest that CIA interventions are associated with an increased risk of an onset of civil war, while KGB support independently of CIA support, does not seem to matter.

[14] Our results also remain robust when we replace the Polity index with two dichotomous measure of regime type, namely, democracy (1 if the Polity index is above +6 and 0 otherwise) and autocracy (1 if the Polity index is below -5 and 0 otherwise).

[15] These results are presented in an online appendix.

To further examine the predictive performance of our models reported in Table 1, we examine the ROC curves, which plot the true positive rate (or the sensitivity of the model) on the *x*-axis versus the true negative rate (or the specificity) on the *y*-axis.[16]

Figure 4. The Area under the curve



Figure 4 presents the ROC curves for two different model specifications from column 1 and column 7 displayed in Table 1. The baseline model in column 1 is a simple model which includes only the CIA intervention dummy, and omits all the control variables. The specification results in column 7 includes all the relevant control variables in the model. As seen from Figure 4, the baseline model with only the CIA variable performs reasonably well given the location of its line relative to the 45°line, which is the point at which randomly guessing the outcome lies. The Area Under Curve (AUC hereafter) ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.5 corresponding with random performance. The shape of the curve exhibit the inverse relationship between sensitivity and specificity at different cut points. As seen there, the AUC displayed is at 0.706, which is a considerable improvement over guessing. Notice that by including all other relevant control variables the AUC only increases to 0.77, which is a 6-point increase over using just the CIA intervention variable.

In Table 2, we present results of the disaggregated measure of CIA support to a surrogate regime and CIA support in general on the risk of an onset of a civil war. Recall that general CIA support need not be directed towards defending a surrogate regime. In other words, support only is assistance to a favoured regime.

[16] For detailed discussion on the ROC curve, see Fawcett, Tom. 2006. "An Introduction to Roc Analysis." *Pattern Recognition Letters* 27:861–74, Krznowski, Wojtek J. and David J. Hand. 2009. *Roc Curves for Continuous Data*. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall .

Table 2: Disaggregated CIA intervention and Civil war onset

	(1) onset1	(2) onset1	(3) onset1	(4) onset1	(5) onset1	(6) onset1	(7) onset1
CIA support only t-1	-0.77**	-0.77**	-0.81**	-0.75**	-0.50	-0.39	-0.37
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.30)
CIA intervention t-1	0.67***	0.65***	0.75***	0.77***	0.64***	0.67***	0.64***
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)
KGB Intervention t-1		-0.15	-0.19	-0.10	-0.09	0.07	0.09
		(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)
log Income per capita t-1			-0.50***	-0.52***	-0.49***	-0.39***	-0.46***
			(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Polity (regime type) t-1				0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log Population Size t-1					0.26***	0.27***	0.26***
					(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ethnic fractionalization t-1						1.19***	1.10***
						(0.33)	(0.33)
Oil exporter t-1							0.37
							(0.31)
Constant	-1.79***	-1.78***	1.77**	2.00*	-0.71	-2.33*	-1.79
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.85)	(1.06)	(1.11)	(1.33)	(1.32)
Countries	152	152	150	148	148	148	148
Observations	4,762	4,762	4,611	4,472	4,472	4,472	4,471

Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
(3) Logit estimator reports coefficients
(4) Peace years & 3 natural cubic splines estimated in all tests

In column 1, we test the disaggregated measure of CIA support followed by KGB support in column 2. As seen there, a state that just receives support relative to states that are installed by the CIA (surrogate states) predict the onset of civil wars negatively, but surrogate states increase their risk of civil war. Note the variable CIA intervention is now capturing the partial effect of CIA surrogacy since support only is entered as a separate term. These results are statistically significant at the 5% level. This means that the results on CIA interventions in Table 1 were driven almost entirely by civil war onsets where a CIA surrogate government was in place. What explains this finding is difficult to pinpoint, but two reasonable explanations exist. First, overthrowing a regime and installing a surrogate may lead to people´s movements that receive more intensive support from the KGB. Direct intervention of the CIA in Guatemala in 1954 to overthrow the Arbenz government, for instance, resulted in the outbreak of civil war. Other examples are the replacement of the Elected Mozzadeh government in a coup in Iran, which ultimately galvanized anti-American forces that eventually overthrew the Shah. Secondly, it is also highly likely that the CIA replaced those leaders who they perceived as weak against communist oppositions, thereby removing weak leaders and unwittingly intensifying conflict. Indeed, at least one historian claims that the leadership in South Vietnam at one

point resembled a "revolving door" because of the constant change in leadership (Herring 2014).

The effect of CIA surrogacy is statistically highly significant across the columns and is robust to the addition of all the controls, whereas CIA support only variable becomes statistically insignificant. The odds ratio suggests that countries with CIA surrogates increased their risk of civil war outbreak by roughly 90% when all controls are in the model. Again, a comparison of the relative effects with per capita income and ethnic fractionalization etc. against the CIA intervention variable suggests that the CIA´s substantive impact is quite large. The control variables show the same effects as those reported in Table 1.

Next, we turn to our instrumental variable analyses to account for possible endogeneity. Already existing conflict might have brought CIA intervention, or some omitted variable might cause both conflict and CIA intervention. The results are presented in Table 3. Notice that the p-value from the Wald test of exogeneity only narrowly misses statistical significance, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, making the instrumental variables applicable (Wooldridge 2002: 472-477).

Table 3: CIA and KGB intervention and Civil war onset - IV estimations

	(1) **onset**
CIA Intervention t-1	1.83**
	(0.74)
KGB Intervention t-1	0.62**
	(0.30)
Per capita GDP (log) t-1	-0.23***
	(0.07)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.04**
	(0.02)
Population (log) t-1	0.11**
	(0.05)
Ethnic Fractionalization index t-1	0.79***
	(0.26)
Oil Exports dummy t-1	-0.06
	(0.21)
Peace Years t-1	-0.02
	(0.02)
Spline 1	-0.00
	(0.00)
Spline 2	0.00
	(0.00)
Spline 3	-0.00
	(0.00)
Constant	-0.89
	(0.81)

Estimator	IV probit
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi2 (p-value)	0.1388
Years effects	Yes
Number of Countries	143
Observati+A9:B32ons	4,349

Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
(3) IV probit estimator reports coefficients

As seen on Table 3, the result on CIA interventions is still positive and statistically significant even after controlling for endogeneity concerns instrumented with variables that explain CIA interventions but are variables that do not directly cause conflict or are caused by them. Notice that now KGB intervention also becomes statistically significant, lending some support to the view that rivalry between these two camps may matter. Substantively, holding all controls at their means, a successful CIA intervention is associated with the odds of increasing the risk of civil war by over 600%, which is significant at the 5% level. A successful KGB intervention increases the odds of conflict outbreak by about 86%, which is significant at the 5% level. The odds ratio in these instances are three times as large as in the corresponding logit estimations reported in Table 1 and 2. This suggests that the attenuation bias from measurement error in the CIA dummy variable which does not fully capture the intensity of intervention (due to lack of further information and details) potentially relates to a measurement error problem which does not fully capture reverse causality and omitted variables bias. The effects of the control variables are roughly the same as those reported in Table 1 and 2. The results taken together clearly support the proposition that ignoring the direct effects of superpower rivalry is mistaken.

Our next task is to see to what extent CIA and KGB interventions prolonged civil war. Table 4 reports the results of the Weibull analyses for all interventions and Table 5 reports results following disaggregation of the interventions into support-only and surrogates. The coefficients are interpreted as the multiplicative change in duration for one unit change in the independent variable.

Table 4: CIA and KGB interventions and civil war duration

	(1) _t	(2) _t	(3) _t	(4) _t	(5) _t
CIA intervention	0.43*** (-3.4)	0.42*** (-3.5)	0.46*** (-3.4)	0.42*** (-3.8)	.44*** (-3.7)
KGB intervention		0.89 (-0.39)	1.3 (0.66)	1.3 (0.82)	1.2 (0.49)
Sons of soil			10.8*** (5.1)	11.9*** (5.5)	10.6*** (5.3)
Ethnic wars				1.9*** (4.8)	1.8 *** (4.7)
Log income/pc					0.94 (-0.58)
Coups & Revols					0.07*** (-5.7)
Non contiguity					0.10 (0.27)
Constant	117.9***	123.5***	71.9***	3.82***	4.27***
ln_p	-0.35***	-0.34***	-0.28***	-0.24***	-0.20***
Failures	162	155	155	155	150
Observations	1,013	999	999	999	978

Notes:
(1) Z statistic in parenthesis
(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

As seen in Table 4, column 1, CIA interventions show a shorter duration of civil wars compared with non-CIA intervention wars. In column 2, KGB intervention are not statistically significant. The magnitude of the CIA parameter is informative. Controlling for KGB intervention, a civil war with CIA support to the government shows a 42% reduction in duration. In column 3, when we enter Fearon´s (2004) sons of the soil wars, CIA wars remain shorter, but sons of the soil wars show a strongly statistically significant and substantively large effect. Sons of the soil wars are roughly 11 times longer than non-sons of the soil wars. Interestingly, the CIA effect on shorter wars survives the inclusion of ethnic wars and coups and revolutions, suggesting that the short-war duration of CIA wars is not because they were likely to be more associated with coups and revolutions and less associated with ethnic wars.

Table 5: Disaggregated CIA interventions and civil war duration

	(1) _t	(2) _t	(3) _t	(4) _t	(5) _t
CIA support only	0.31***	0.30***	0.47*	0.82	0.88
	(-2.8)	(-2.9)	(-1.9)	(-0.50)	(-0.35)
CIA intervention	0.60*	0.58*	0.57**	0.45***	0.47***
	(1.8)	(-1.9)	(-2.0)	(-3.0)	(-2.9)
KGB Intervention		0.86	1.3	1.3	1.2
		(-0.40)	(0.65)	(0.82)	(0.49)
Sons of the soil			9.9***	11.7***	10.4***
			(4.9)	(5.4)	(5.3)
Ethnic war				1.8***	1.8***
				(4.6)	(4.5)
Log income/pc					0.94
					(-0.45)
Coups and Revolutions					0.07***
					(-5.7)
Non-contiguity					1.1
					(0.34)
Constant	114.3***	119.3***	71.1***	45.8***	4.25***
ln_p	-0.34***	-0.33***	-0.27***	-0.24***	-0.20***
Observations	1,013	999	999	999	978

Notes:
(1) Z statistic in parenthesis
(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

The CIA support to governments seems to have had an independent effect of shortening wars, perhaps because CIA support strengthened governments even if CIA interventions were cause for wars to get started. Results in Table 5 are almost the same as those reported in Table 4. Both CIA support only and CIA interventions (surrogacy) reduce the duration of conflict, but it is only CIA surrogacy that remains robust to the inclusion of other types of wars. The Kaplan-Meier graphs of the hazard rates of each of our variables display our results visually (see Figure 6). The results, using entirely different threshold for war starts and ends nevertheless support Fearon´s (2004) results on sons of the soil wars as being unusually lengthy compared with other types of civil war. Overall, the results on CIA intervention is robust to the inclusion of a range of controls also used by others (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008).

Figure 6: Kaplan–Meier survival estimates for conflict duration, 1946–1989




CIA Surrogate
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0
10
20
30
40
Conflict duration (years)
CIA Surrogate = 0
CIA Surrogate = 1


CIA Support
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0
10
20
30
40
Conflict duration (years)
CIA Support = 0
CIA Support = 1

Next, we focus on how the CIA- and KGB-supported wars ended to get some grip on how superpower surrogacy wars ended. Since we have examined only support for governments and not rebels, we should anticipate that superpower support increased the likelihood that governments prevailed over rebels even though others report that rebels were more likely to win Cold War era civil wars (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Data on war termination suggest that the vast number of civil wars simply peter out rather than end decisively, which we count as a win for the government since effective challenge of state power ends if a conflict peters out (Kreutz 2010). Table 6 provides a breakdown of how wars supported by the superpowers ended during the Cold War.[17]

As seen there, CIA- and KGB-supported governments make up 48 of the 138 war terminations during the 1946-1989 period. This is a full 35% of all terminations. Of these civil wars, CIA-supported governments seem to have defeated rebels 28/37 (76%) times, while KGB-supported governments defeated rebels 6/11 (55%) times. Clearly, of the superpower surrogate wars, governments were more likely to win, particularly when the US supported a government.

[17] We use the UCDP war termination dataset. For a detailed explanation, see Kreutz (2010).

Table 6. Termination of superpower-supported civil wars, 1946-1989

	No. of conflicts	No. of conflicts ended	Percentage
Total number of conflicts ended	141	138	100%
Number of conflicts ended with CIA involvement		37	27%
Number of conflicts ended with KGB involvement		11	8%

	No. of conflicts ended	Percentage
Number of conflicts ended with CIA involvement	37	100%
Number of conflicts ended with Govt. victory	28	76%
Number of conflicts ended with Rebel victory	6	16%
Number of conflicts ended with Peace deals	3	8%

	No. of conflicts	Percentage
Number of conflicts ended with KGB involvement	11	100%
Number of conflicts ended with Govt. victory	6	55%
Number of conflicts ended with Rebel victory	1	1%
Number of conflicts ended with Peace deals	4	36%

5. Conclusions

Scholarship in the social sciences on civil war has generally avoided the inclusion of superpower rivalry directly in explanations of civil war. Most studies examine only endogeneous factors to explain why actors fail to avoid costly violence. Descriptions of the concerns of the US and the USSR during extremely tense bipolar power struggles during the Cold War treats civil wars in peripheral countries as a nuisance in the US´s search for stability (Halperin 1963, Kissinger 1959). In the words of Donald Snow, Third World civil wars were "distant thunder" with no vital national interests at stake for superpowers (Snow 1997) Yet, the exigencies of superpower rivalry and the "necessary peace" in terms of avoiding direct confrontation with each other, the superpowers fought proxy wars by challenging each other for influence even in distant places (Snow 1987). Indeed, some historians of US foreign relations see the Cold War era struggles between the superpowers as "global war" (Westad 2007). Others have identified the conscious policies of the US of supporting capitalist dictators during the Cold War as a recipe for violence (LaFeber 1983). Recently, Cold War era civil wars have entered analyses directly (Albornoz and Hauk 2014, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The interest in the Cold War from the civil war angle has been about how the Cold War, or superpower rivalry, affected the technology of warfighting. Our study is different because we examine the direct impact of superpower interventions overtly and covertly in support of governments.

Our results show clearly that US involvement abroad through the arm of the CIA led to a higher civil war risk, controlling for a host of potential confounding factors including bias from endogeneity. While US involvement increased risk, KGB interventions may have had a lower impact. These results compliment historical studies that suggest that USSR ambitions and reach for instigating rebellion were fairly circumscribed compared with the US´s particularly when it came to Latin America. However, our results also suggest that superpower wars, as measured by the duration of civil war unambiguously associate with shorter durations. These results are robust to the inclusion of coups and revolutions, which are known to have shorter durations. Preliminarily, we might conclude from these results that the superpowers may indeed have been a restraining influence on wars that may otherwise have become bogged down in wars of attrition. Much historiography from the Cold War era suggest that the superpowers, despite fighting by proxy, were highly cognizant of avoiding escalation to prevent any direct confrontation. Despite wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the superpower conflicts seem to have been short. Future studies might examine how superpower assisted wars ended since our study cannot directly determine whether CIA-supported wars were shorter due to CIA surrogates prevailing over adversaries, or indeed losing to rebels, or whether indeed these ideological struggles were more amenable to negotiated settlement. What we can definitively say, however, is that social science theories of civil war should not ignore the impact that superpower, systemic great power rivalry might have on proxy wars, which are features of many of not most of the current civil wars around the world. Our study supports others who claim that exogenous factors matter for understanding the feasibility of civil war, an under-theorized area in civil war research (Gleditsch et al. 2010).

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