PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO EXPLAINING SETTLEMENT

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ABSTRACT

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This article argues for an historical and structural approach to explaining settlement. It argues that how institutions function and how actors pursue their ends is in part determined by slow-moving structural relationships whose logic and trajectory and effects can best be seen historically. Popular "ethnic" expectations are derived not just from interaction with other social groups but also from experience of these structures of power and their movement over time. Introducing these factors into analysis can complement more conventional analyses of actors, negotiators, and institutions. The article outlines some conclusions that can be drawn from the case-studies and their implications for the historical structural approach.

Key words: settlement, structure, history, ethnicity, conflict, actor and structure.

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INTRODUCTION

This volume brings together detailed case studies of successive settlement attempts in six diverse conflicts. The purpose is to identify patterns of conflict resolution. The question guiding this volume and the research project on which it was based is whether similar structural conditions and geo-historical processes predispose towards settlement in different types of cases? The authors of each case study were asked to outline sequences of settlement initiatives and to trace what made the difference between failure and success in their case. They were asked to take account of the historical origins of conflict and the structural relations of power and resource-distribution in state and society, and to assess the role, if any, they played in conflict and settlement. Thus each of the case studies contextualises the detailed narratives of settlement attempts in a historical and structural analysis. In addition there are two comparative articles. John Coakley, in a wide-ranging analysis, outlines the comparative literature and what is already known from quantitative and comparative research. The present article outlines and assesses the value of one distinctive type of explanation of settlement that highlights the causal role of historical process and structural conditions.

This article has two aims. First, it introduces the ideas that motivate and the questions that guide the organisation of this volume. In particular it sketches the concepts, hypotheses and models of explanation that are distinctive to an historical and structural approach, comparing them to more conventional approaches. Second it explores some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this set of case studies, asking how far they show the value of an historical and structural focus. The first section of the article discusses the principles of case selection; the second section discusses what is to be explained, outlining what we understand by settlement and settlement success. The third section deals with explanatory concepts and theories of settlement and gives the rationale for a focus on historical processes and structural conditions. The fourth section of the article outlines some conclusions that can be drawn from the case-studies and their implications for the historical structural approach.

CASE SELECTION

In this project we have selected a set of very different "ethnic" conflicts: the Côte d'Ivoire, Macedonia, Mindanao, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Zanzibar. In each case, there has been a succession of settlement initiatives of different degrees of success. But on other measures—timing of conflict and settlement, experience of violence, state structure and capacity, ethnic solidarity and popular expectations - the cases are radically different. The case selection is not intended to be representative of ethnic conflict, much less typical. Instead we have chosen cases which vary on the dimensions that we want to explore in explanation: history, structure and ethnicity. Indeed we have chosen cases which might conventionally be dismissed as "outliers" on these and other dimensions. This allows us to probe

for causal processes that may be highlighted in these cases, and present but much less obvious in others (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 297).

The history and temporality of conflict and settlement vary markedly between the cases. All of these conflicts were formed in the context of imperial rule and its withdrawal, although the timing of this and the "age" of the conflict varies markedly. Several of the cases have roots in violent dispossession, population movements and massacre, but at very different historical periods. The Rwandan genocide took place less than two decades ago. The only comparable process in Ireland took place four centuries ago, and its legacies are attenuated by economic development, regional institution-building and state stabilisation, although still with causal relevance to the recent violent conflict (see Ruane and Todd, this volume).

State and regional structures vary markedly. In three cases (Northern Ireland, Mindanao, Zanzibar) the conflict takes place in a territorially defined part of a larger state, in the case of Northern Ireland, a rich and stable Western democracy. In other cases (the Côte d'Ivoire, Macedonia, Rwanda) the conflict has to do with minorities and majorities within the state and affects the structure of the state itself. At the limit (Rwanda in 1994, Côte d'Ivoire in early 2011) it has led to the breakdown of the state as an actor independent of the warring parties. Regional geopolitics also varies: it is highly unstable and conflict-prone in the Great Lakes and the Balkans, in contrast to the highly stable West European, British-Irish arena.

All the cases are of politicised "ethnic" conflicts, involving everyday multiplex cultural distinctions that are hard to change, ascribed as well as assumed. However the form that everyday "ethnicity" takes varies very considerably from one case to the next: in Macedonia, there are clear, exclusive ethno-national distinctions that also coincide with religious and political distinctions; in the Côte d'Ivoire and Zanzibar, while the organisations and parties in conflict are clear, a precise definition of the populations in conflict is still in process of formation. While we do not attempt to define "ethnicity" or "ethnic conflict" here (see variously Horowitz, 2000: 51-4; Hale, 2004; Ruane and Todd, 2004; Chandra, 2006; Jenkins, 2008: 14), we understand ethnic conflicts in the broadest sense of the term as involving populations, "peoples", not just leaders or fighters or spoilers. That is why broader structural conditions and historically conditioned cultural expectations may be highly relevant to their resolution.

Four of the cases involve significant levels of violence between politically- and militarily- organised populations embedded in relations of state-guaranteed inequality: Rwanda, Northern Ireland, the Côte d'Ivoire and Mindanao. We include two conflicts—Macedonia and Zanzibar—with much less violence but with many of the same elements as the other conflicts: descent based narratives, territorially-based cultural as well as economic distinction, political organisation of the competing groups, horizontal inequalities upheld by the form of the state, in both cases in an unstable region.

This wide variation means that each case study is likely to highlight some processes favouring or hindering settlement that may be present but less evident in other cases.

SETTLEMENTS : WHAT IS TO BE EXPLAINED ?

Coakley (this volume) shows how the very great variety in types of ethnic group, types of state and types of conflict make any generalisations about ethnic conflict difficult. Generalisations about settlement meet the further difficulty of defining appropriate criteria of settlement and settlement success. Success can be defined minimally, over a short time span, simply as "ending civil wars" (Stedman and Rothchild, 2002), taking the radical reduction of violence in the 5-year post-agreement period as the measure. More substantively, we might, with Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) take the implementation of peace accords as the measure of settlement although here we would need to distinguish between accords that are only partially implemented and those fully implemented, those where implementation is stalled and those where it is simply slow. Maximally (with Lederach, 1997), we might take the undermining of divisions (communal, cultural, and structurally-defined conflicts of interest) as the end-goal and attempt to assess how far settlement has advanced towards this.

Of course, as Darby & MacGinty (2008: 1-3) point out, making peace is a process involving series of settlement initiatives, with different phases (negotiation, ending violence, reaching and implementing agreements and building a more positive peace) which can occur in different sequences. No single mark of "success" is appropriate in all cases: for example, there are different public and political expectations of the recent settlement in Zanzibar—where violence has been intermittent and low-level—and in neighbouring post-genocide Rwanda. However relative failure or success is identifiable within each case, placing successive initiatives on a scale which runs from outright failure (increasing the intensity of violence) to reaching and implementing agreements to the diffusion of division. The authors of each case study were asked to identify the processes in that case that led to movement up or down the failure-success scale. This article compares these processes between cases.

MODES OF EXPLANATION: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

The voluminous literature on ethnic conflict, internal conflict, civil war and settlement which Coakley (this volume) surveys leaves open important questions about the longer term and structural conditions of conflict and settlement which have not been emphasised in the recent literature.[1] One dominant approach is to narrow the parameters of study to particular levels of violent conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), to short-term criteria of settlement (Stedman, 2002) and to clear-cut independent variables that may explain violence/peace across all cases. Peace research equally focuses on immediate forms of mediation, negotiation and guarantees of security (Crocker, 1996; Crocker et al, 1996 ; Zartman, 1989 ; Touval and Zartman, 1989). Despite advances in knowledge, there are dangers that a short-term focus on particular variables will feed into what MacGinty (2008) critically

describes as the "liberal peace" model, offering a set of standardized techniques for international peace-makers.

A different strand of recent scholarship focuses on complexly defined explanatory variables including structural "horizontal" inequalities (Stewart, 2008), ethnic politicisation and the role of the state in ethnic exclusion (Wimmer, 2002; Cederman et al, 2010) and the multiple levels and roles of transnational linkages (variously Keating, 2001; Gleditsch, 2007). From a theoretical and comparative perspective, it is highly plausible that the impact of particular variables—from economic development to insurrection opportunities, from international mediation, equality of representation, guarantees of security and participation to external impacts— depends on their sequencing and combination within a conflict. In this article, we follow this direction of approach but give it a longer historical frame, to allow investigation of the interrelation between state-formation and state-change, on the one hand, and ethnic politicisation and (de)mobilisation on the other, and to reveal the slower moving processes at work that may be overlooked in a short-term analysis (Pierson, 2004: 14). The longer time frame shows clearly the importance of looking beyond present state boundaries to the varieties of transnational linkages which offer resources—alliances, information, economic opportunities, population movements, arms, advice, and objective threat—to the parties in conflict.

The broad intuition which motivates this argument is that how institutions function and how actors pursue their ends is in part determined by slow-moving structural relationships whose logic and trajectory and effects can best be seen historically. States are constituted by a dense institutionalised set of such relationships, including relations in the wider region (which define territorial boundaries, their permanence and permeability), and relations with and within the wider population. Popular "ethnic" expectations are derived not just from interaction with other social groups but also from experience of these structures of power and their movement over time (see variously Carter and Fenton, 2010; Hale, 2004; Ruane and Todd, 2004). Introducing these factors into analysis can complement more conventional analyses of actors, negotiators, and institutions, as the following examples illustrate.

- **Spoilers:** Spoilers are of course significant in preventing or destroying peace agreements (Stedman, 1997), but these actors need resources to be effective. These resources are typically given by the state-society configuration, including the institutions of law and order, and relations between militants, parties and populations. It is important to look below the fact of spoilers to the underlying conditions which give them efficacy.

- **Leadership:** The role of leadership is undoubtedly essential in mediation, negotiation and in the process of transition from violence to peace (Brown, 1996; Lipjhart, 1977). If one-time insurrectionaries are to turn to participation within democratic political institutions, they need leaders who legitimate this transformation (Jung et al, 2005). However, effective leadership has to do not simply with the character of individuals but also with the opportunities on

offer that give a plausible rationale for peace. Our focus is not on the psychology of leadership but rather on the institutional opportunities that encourage it.

- **Effective representative institutions:** Consociational institutions, often conjoined with levels of territorial autonomy, are among the most common institutional provisions of settlement in the contemporary period. It is clear why: a sense of equitable participation underpins the sense of legitimacy necessary to allow peace, at least in those conflicts where populations play a key role (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996; Coakley, 2010; Jung et al, 2005). However the way that any institution functions depends crucially on other structural relations, including the relative power resources of the different actors, and popular expectations and coordination patterns (Hall and Thelen, 2009), both determined by the wider state-institutional configuration. As we argue below, situating power-sharing institutions in their structural context can provide an explanation of the wide variation of functioning of formally similar institutions.

- **Security dilemmas:** Security concerns often overturn settlements, preventing demilitarisation and demobilisation (Posen, 1993; Walter, 1997). Conversely a focus simply on immediate security - arms and disarmament - is insufficient given that rearmament is an option for most organisations. More important, and more difficult to assess, is the will to work peacefully in the long-term. In deciding their own and assessing their opponents commitments in this respect, the calculations of militants converge with those of populations and politicians, involving qualitative judgements of, for example, whether the state has a long-term interest in living up to its promises, and whether the wider regional and geo-political configurations are likely to work for or against this. Protagonists themselves assess whether and how changing structural and geopolitical conditions are likely to affect state practices, and their conclusions crucially affects their strategy.

The different levels of analysis can be shown in a diagram:

ACCORD(S)
- Terms
- How negotiated
- Parties included/excluded
- Implementation processes
- How underpinned

Conflicting Actors: states, armies, parties, public
- Actors (individual politicians, political parties, armed groups, ethnic groups)
- Political institutions & party system
- Nature of the political regime
- Control of the army

Wider Geo-politics
- Nature of boundaries, e.g. political boundaries overlapping political ones
- Interest of major international powers
- UN involvement
- Neighbouring states
- Regional organisations (EU)

Structural conditions and structural processes
- Conjunctural/synchronic: demographic composition, balance of ethnic & religious forces, centrifugal vs centripetal tendencies, stability of current ethnic balance (or imbalance), role of state in underpinning or constituting inequalies
- Longue duree/diachronic tendencies: changes in these over time and whether there are directions to them, eg long term tendencies
- Public expectations and categorisations

Much of the literature on conflict resolution focuses on accords and actors. We have asked our contributors to focus also on structural conditions and processes, internally and transnationally. Each level is interconnected: Who the actors are and what their strategies are depend on structural opportunities and trends, affected on the one hand by geo-political linkages and on the other by government action, including the implementation of peace accords.

We have argued that not just a structural but also a long historical view is necessary to find out the causal processes favouring or hindering settlement. This is to conceive of history not as a succession of events but as a process in which structural relationships are formed, reproduced and changed. Introducing this historical dimension provides new and potentially fruitful causal perspectives and hypotheses. Consider recent discussions of commitment problems and credible

change. Commitment problems were initially theorised in terms of military agents' disinclination to lay down their arms because thereby they would lose bargaining power and be at the mercy of their opponents (Walter, 1997; Glassmeyer and Sambanis, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2010). They are also understood more generally in terms of protagonists' disbelief in the state's commitment to implement agreements, and thus their own disinclination to uphold their side of the agreement (Jarsted and Nilsson, 2008). This is a problem of legitimacy not simply of bargaining: it affects ordinary populations whose first-hand experience of violent conflict has led them to take state and politicians' statements with total disbelief. How states, politicians and media re-earn a level of credence (from people as well as politicians as well as paramilitaries) after it has been lost is a question which deserves closer sustained attention. Jarsted and Nilsson (2008) argue that "costly signalling" is likely to bring credibility. Like Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), they suggest that military power-sharing and territorial devolution are credible because costly to the state (See also World Bank, 2011: 105-112). An historical focus generates a different analysis of causality. If these actions are credible, it is not because they are costly but because they change entrenched historical patterns of exclusion and conflict (and this is likely to involve difficult and costly institutional restructurings).

Of course this is to make a series of assumptions, which can only be assessed through historically-informed empirical case studies:

- That there are discernible historical patterns of conflict, reproduced by identifiable sets of mechanisms. For example, initial events can set in place power relations, institutional inter-relations, interlocked practices that generate interests in their reproduction, taking on properties of "increasing returns" (Pierson, 2004 : 17-36). Such patterns are not deterministic: the most recent historical institutionalist literature focuses on mechanisms of incremental and transformative change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). But they provide strong incentives for choice, generating tendencies towards reproduction which are not easily overcome.

- That these are recognised by protagonists and inform their strategy. Of course protagonists interpret history according to their cultural concepts and ideological narratives, and their interpretation of causality will be different from that of the social scientist, but the same broad patterns of coercion, exclusion, rebellion, growth or decline may be recognised.

- That settlement initiatives that interrupt or counter these patterns give good reasons for the protagonists to change their strategy.

What are the historical patterns? The strategy of research adopted in this volume is not directly to theorise the macro processes of state and nation building (Rokkan in Flora, 1999; Gellner, 1983 and more recently Wimmer, 2002), imperial expansion and contraction (Wolf, 1982; Wallerstein,1976), nor the autonomous role of ethno-cultural difference and division of labour (Horowitz, 2000). Rather it is to show in each case how these processes intersect to produce particular configurations or patterns of conflict. Each case study shows the particular conjunctural pattern that

resulted. The patterns take different forms: a deep-set quasi-systemic set of relations as in Northern Ireland; a more fluid conjoinment of historic division, political parties and territorial inequality, as in Zanzibar; an immediate military-political stand-off between territorially-based forces, as in the Côte d'Ivoire before Gbagbo stood down, relatively loosely linked to interests arising from uneven territorial development and religious distinction.

In the remainder of this article, we work from the case studies to address some of the questions raised theoretically in this introduction, and to assess the value and potential of a historical and structural approach.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Institutions, social structure, and history.

Do particular institutional provisions of settlement initiatives, for example power-sharing provisions, make the difference between success and failure in settlement initiatives? Coakley (this volume) gives an overview of the contemporary evidence working primarily from large-scale studies of short time frame. We take two claims that he discusses—one focussing on institutions, one on wider social structures—and add a claim which focuses on a longer historical time-frame. We assess them not against large data sets, but against the six case studies in this volume.

   i. Well-designed power-sharing representative institutions (and more specifically, consociational institutions) favour settlement; (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004)

   ii. More general power-sharing arrangements for example in the military (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007) and/or more general egalitarian provisions through the society (Stewart, 2008) favour settlement.

   iii. Settlement is favoured by effective change in the historical-structural patterns of conflict.

All three claims may be true. For example good consociational institutions may stabilise settlement when wider patterns of conflict are in process of being changed through the enactment of a range of equality laws. We do not attempt to explore these possible interrelationships here. Our aims are much more limited, to assess each claim in light of the case studies and in particular to clarify the potential contribution of the third claim, which has received least attention in the contemporary literature.

With respect to claim (i), in five of the six cases—the Côte d'Ivoire, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Zanzibar—settlement initiatives included executive power-sharing agreements, although of different scope and form in each case. However this was as much the case for early failed settlement initiatives as for later partially successful ones. Power sharing provisions - even when agreed on by participating parties and even when implemented—do not make the difference between the success and failure of settlement initiatives.

In several cases, including Macedonia and Northern Ireland (see Wolff, 2001; McGarry and O'Leary, 2004: 260-293) later successful agreements involved much improved institutional design. In Northern Ireland, for example, between the 1973-4 failed initiative and the 1998 successful initiative the form of power-sharing changed from voluntary coalition of middle ground parties (1973-4) to an enforced grand coalition of all parties proportional to their representation in the Assembly, appointed by the D'Hondt method (1998). This made the executive significantly more inclusive. Further, the form of cross-border bodies was made much more precise in 1998 than in 1973 and there was provision for continued institutionalised British-Irish oversight of the new institutions in 1998 but not in the earlier initiative. These factors fed into the success of the later agreement. However, they do not explain the failure of the earlier: a more inclusive executive would not have prevented the strike which brought down the first executive; on the contrary it would have made that executive even more unappealing to the loyalist strikers. If better consociational design was necessary for success in 1998, its absence did not cause failure in 1973-4.

Even where power-sharing institutions are functioning, their practical capacity to ensure inclusion of once-excluded groups varies enormously. In Macedonia between 1991-2001, for example, arrangements for power sharing coexisted with intermittent outvoting of the Albanian politicians. Even after the 2001 Agreement, Albanian claims in 2007 that their views were insufficiently being taken into account in Assembly legislation caused a crisis which was resolved only after EU pressure for agreement on procedures (Vasilev, 2011: 57-8). In Northern Ireland, after 1998 and in conjunction with strong equality and rights legislation, the consociational system functions to ensure a genuine sharing of effective power, even if sometimes contentious reforms are blocked. Whether and how the institutions function to ensure inclusion depends crucially on the wider structural context: in Northern Ireland, the role of equality legislation removes the urgent need for agreement on reforms; in Macedonia, the EU role ensures that each party continues to play by the rules of agreement (Vasilev, 2011).

In most of the case studies, there is considerable evidence for claim (ii) that structural reforms towards greater inclusion favour settlement. However the nature of these reforms varies quite radically from case to case. In Macedonia, for example, features which are most emphasised in the literature and in Georgieva, Memeti and Musliu (this volume) include the constitutional changes which make of Macedonia a multi-ethnic state rather than a nation-state of Macedonians, the provisions for Albanian language education, particularly at third level, the increased representation of Albanians in all branches of the public service including policing, and the (not yet fully implemented) provisions for local autonomy. In Northern Ireland, as already noted, the important factors include a very effective fair employment policy, radical reform of policing and criminal justice (although with no integration of former paramilitaries into the police), and potentially expandable cross-border linkages. In the Côte d'Ivoire the key provisions of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of 2007 include integration of the rebel forces into the state army, as well as reform of land-ownership and voting rights so as no longer to

exclude Northerners. In Zanzibar, increased autonomy as well as power-sharing was at the core of the 2010 Maridhiano agreement. And in Mindanao, the most recent and far-reaching 2008 agreement incorporates land rights for the Moro as well as a level of territorial autonomy. In each case, the provisions remove some major inequalities or institutional arrangements used in the past to promote and justify exclusion. Even in the most far-reaching settlement (Northern Ireland), however, they do not ensure full equality of communal condition. While the cases, therefore, give some backing to the view that broadly egalitarian and inclusive provisions favour settlement, they do not confirm the detail of claim (ii) above that particular forms of military power-sharing or territorial autonomy or even of equality legislation in general favour settlement.

What of claim (iii) above, that what favours settlement is effective change in the historical patterns of conflict? The case studies give mixed evidence. In Northern Ireland, one key pattern = the role of the British state in upholding Protestant power and preventing Catholic advance - has changed, and this has allowed even militant republicans to see a gradualist peaceful route to their aims. In Mindanao, the single clearest pattern brought out in Brown's study (this volume) is the long-term decline of the Moro, demographically and economically: the 2008 Agreement would have gone far to counter that, had it not been ruled unconstitutional. In Zanzibar, Ramadhani (this volume) argues that the Maridhiano of 2010 has reversed the political and cultural exclusion of Pemba, and with it the exclusion of one important (Arab and anti-revolutionary) Zanzibarian tradition: whether this holds out prospects of changing its economic marginalisation (and whether this matters for the stability of settlement) is unclear. In Macedonia, the historic patterns of conflict were regional more than internal, and regional threats and pressures remain extant, only partially countered by the still-conditional promises of EU and NATO membership. The internal patterns of conflict are of much more recent provenance, related to the nation-state model of the post-1991 state, and now largely reversed in constitutional law, if not always in practice. In the Côte d'Ivoire, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement provisions remove the recent legal restrictions on land-holding and voting which both in fact and in intent excluded many Northerners. It is as yet too soon to say if and how the new President will be able at once to counter the underlying structural problems in the political economy—the major imbalance between the regions—while at the same time fostering political and cultural inclusion. In Rwanda, Storey (this volume) argues that the structures that furthered exclusion in the past—in particular the dominance of one faction in the state and of the state in the local as well as national political economy—remain, but with different state incumbents.

Although far from decisive, that there is evidence for claim (iii) is itself significant. It shows that there is potential in an historical-structural approach and that it deserves more sustained attention than it has been given in the recent literature. An important issue for further research is how far and when protagonists' perceptions of the "patterns" or "direction" of history influence their strategies, and, even more crucially, how these perceptions are changed.

Spoilers, social structure, and populations:

Do actors make the difference between failure and success of settlement initiatives and if so which actors? Here we look at two claims:

i. One typical cause of settlement failure is the prevalence and type of spoilers. Stedman (1997: 5) defined spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it". He argued that crucial to spoiler success or failure is the action or inaction of international actors.

ii. While spoilers may be the proximate cause of settlement failure, their efficacy is a product of structural relations and opportunities. We can never do away with spoilers, but we can change structures to make them less effective.

The case studies give support to claim (i), showing clearly, as Stedman has argued, that "spoilers" do not work alone. In Rwanda in 1994, the Hutu elite of Habyarimana's circle disowned their own negotiators and worked against the agreed settlement, while the international bodies with at least some power to prevent their actions, did nothing. In Northern Ireland, the 1973-4 power-sharing experiment was brought down by loyalist strikers who eventually won the support of the wider unionist public, while the British government which could have stopped the strike did nothing. In Mindanao, the constitutionality of the 2008 Agreement was challenged by a coalition of "spoilers" (the Christian politicians in Mindanao with a strong interest in undermining this settlement) and Philippine opposition party politicians with little interest in Mindanao and much in exploiting the clientelist character of the political system to gain power in Manila. In Macedonia, in contrast, the 1992 agreement was not brought down, it simply was not implemented by a hard-pressed state which lacked resources, capacity and incentive to do so.

The case studies also confirm that spoilers' efficacy, as claim (ii) states, is based on structurally given opportunities and resources. Storey (this volume) outlines how the political economy of Rwanda in 1994 gave whole swathes of the population reason to fear the effects of the settlement and resources to mobilise against it. Ruane and Todd (this volume) show how the unreformed economic structure of Northern Ireland and the habitual practices of British governance gave the strike leaders all the resources they needed to bring down the settlement. Langer (this volume) shows how the political system and demographic balance gave Gbagbo every reason to hang onto power. While, in the short term, it is essential to develop strategies to counter spoiling tactics, in the longer term it is also important to change the structures which encourage them.

Explanations in terms of "spoilers", however, run the risk of underestimating the importance of populations. Those who opposed the settlement in Northern Ireland in 1974 were not simply isolated extremists, but the majority of the unionist population and a minority of nationalists. If the mode of failure of the settlement owed much to extremist organisations, the fact of its failure was a product of popular expectations. The leaders who organised the strike which was to bring

down the settlement worked hard to increase popular anger against the settlement; however they did not create that anger, they relied on its existence in their calculations and indeed many of them legitimated their actions in terms of popular unionist attitudes and interests. A quarter century later, given different public expectations and a changed socio-political structure, some of the same leaders calculated that they could best serve unionists' interests by leading them into a very similar agreement. Popular as well as political expectations changed. Why and how public attitudes and expectations change in face of changing structures and opportunities is a centrally important question for further research.

Processes of state-change and international action:

It has long been debated whether reform of the state satisfies nationalist movements or simply encourages them to press for more. Much recent debate has focussed on the effects of regional autonomy and more recently of consociational structures in moderating the demands of nationalist parties and the attitudes of nationalist voters (Keating, 2001; Hepburn, 2009; Elias, 2009; Mitchell et al, 2009; for a critical view, see Roeder, 2009). Other recent comparative studies have argued that equalisation policies more generally favour settlement, and work against violent ethnic conflict   (Stewart et al, 2008). Coakley (this volume) gives a thorough overview of the existing literature and summarises the trends, emphasising the serious obstacles to successful settlement. These obstacles are shown in all the case studies in this volume, and they include the tendency of states to back-track on their commitments. It is indicative of this tendency that Coakley (this volume) lists among the most important factors that stabilise settlements, third party enforcement and periodic reviews of implementation.

How, then, are processes of state reform and inclusion to be stimulated and strengthened? Must change always be exogenously stimulated and guaranteed? How far and when do endogenous processes of state change emerge? The case studies in this volume show the very wide range of processes that are involved in initiating and sustaining change in state structures.

The case studies show that some exogenous stimuli to change are usually necessary, but that these take a very wide variety of forms. In Northern Ireland the Irish state was a helpful partner and stimulator of what came to be a largely endogenous process of change, with the Irish continuing to provide a sense of direction and alternative frames of understanding, and occasionally calling in stronger US influence. In other cases, international actors played a stronger role as mentors, paymasters, guarantors, and peacekeepers (as in Macedonia and Rwanda) and as persuaders and intermittent enforcers (in the Côte d'Ivoire). In other cases again—Mindanao, Zanzibar—the international influence is focussed on international aid and rights organisations, with intermittent international mediation.

Even in those cases where the international community plays a crucial role, external action and internal change may go hand in hand. In Macedonia, where state change was tied to EU and NATO conditionality, Macedonian state leaders had already shown a willingness in principle to be inclusive (Ahrens, 2007) but, as

Georgieva, Memeti and Musliu (this volume) show, the consequences of low state capacity, corruption and external threat meant that the difficult task of implementing the agreements reached in 1992 and subsequent years were not achieved. It took the added pressure of international demands and the added resources of international bodies to achieve considerable reform after 2001 (Vasilev, 2011).

In Macedonia, as in Northern Ireland, the ending of violence was contemporaneous with the process of settlement. In both cases, processes of inclusion and state-change were part of an overall package that included the decommissioning of weapons, security guarantees, demilitarisation and a series of changes in policing and justice. In Northern Ireland, completion of the implementation process was very slow and required movement on all of these fronts. In some other conflicts—Rwanda, the Côte d'Ivoire—the first requirement for ending violence may be the ousting of incumbents. Still, as both Storey and Langer show, much remains to be accomplished if conflict potential is to be reduced. Notably, state-change may be necessary even when it is not demanded by insurgents. In Mindanao the demands of the insurgents are primarily for autonomy rather than for change in the Philippine state. Yet the absence of such state changes has also undermined peace and settlement: the clientelist politics of the Philippines, as Brown (this volume) shows, makes particularly difficult the ratification of agreements.

If these case studies show that international action is usually necessary to complement and strengthen state processes of reform, they also show that it is effective when it is in line with the specific needs of the conflict. "Best fit" solutions (World Bank, 2011: 107) mean taking account not just of resources but also of historical patterns and expectations. Storey (this volume) argues that one of the flaws of the Arusha Accord was that its formally fair and progressive provisions neither recognised nor effectively countered the real patterns of power and exclusion in Rwanda and thereby exacerbated their effects. The Zanzibar Maridhiano, on Ramadhani's analysis, was effective precisely because it recognised the CUF, and Pemba's, interest in more autonomy within the Tanzanian union. Rather than imposing a Western "liberal peace" (MacGinty, 2008) the argument in this article is that international intervention is most likely to be effective in stimulating endogenous change when it works on the specific conflict patterns in the region to change public and political expectations and choices.

CONCLUSION

This article serves as an introduction to the detailed analyses of conflict and settlement presented in Coakley's article and the case studies which follow. We have here argued for the potential value of a structural-historical approach not as an alternative to but as a complement to analysis of actors and accords. Structures constrain the possibilities of settlement, and changing them can make long-term settlement success more likely. In identifying which changes to make, we have argued that it is important to identify the historical patterns of conflict in the region itself: countering them is likely to have much more dramatic effects on popular and political attitudes than other worthwhile and costly actions and gestures. But structures and history take effect only through actors, who make settlements and

attempt to implement them, in the process changing aspects of state structures and practices. It is important to take all of these levels into account in analysis, and most of all the interrelationships between them.

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[1] Brown (1996 22-3) pointed out that much more had been written on the structural than on the proximate causes of conflict, but since then most of the literature has focussed on the proximate causes - in particular on elites, leaders, and the particular factors that motivate them.