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ABSTRACT

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This paper analyses the pattern of conflict resolution in Zanzibar. Since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 this semi-autonomous territory within the State of Tanzania has remained on the brink of conflict. The paper argues that the conflict in Zanzibar should not be seen as merely a political stand-off with post-election rioting. In fact it has most of the characteristics of a deep-seated and protracted conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities. These in turn have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history (particularly the slave trade). The paper examines strategies employed in resolution of the conflict to find explanations for the failure of the first and second Muafaka (Agreement). The paper argues that the 2010 Reconciliation (Maridhiano) offers actors better prospects of success than the previous attempts.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

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IDENTITY POLITICS AND COMPLEXITIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR

INTRODUCTION

Zanzibar is an autonomous region within the state of Tanzania with its own executive, legislature and judiciary. Since 1992, immediately after multi-party politics was introduced in Tanzania, the same party system that prevented conflict on the Tanzanian mainland led in Zanzibar to deep political division on a territorial basis and a cycle of recurrent violence following elections. On analysis, what appears as merely a political conflict with post-election violence has in fact most of the characteristics of a deep-seated and protracted conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities (political and economic). These in turn have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history (particularly the slave trade).

The conflict in Zanzibar is of general interest because it exhibits many of the features that make up protracted violent ethnic conflict: a brutal past history; ethno-racial divisions aligned with a strong territorial basis exacerbated by extreme economic and political inequalities and a politicization of these divisions. However, in contrast to similar conflicts elsewhere in Africa, this conflict appears now to have been settled after only relatively minor violence. It thus poses several puzzles. Was this ever a serious conflict? If so, how was further development of conflict prevented? What role did the Union state play in both conflict and settlement? Did belonging to a stable federal state—Tanzania—crucially help in the settlement process or, conversely, did federalization serve to prolong conflict?

This paper proceeds by sketching the different levels of conflict and settlement processes. It begins by outlining the geo-historical roots of the conflict and the ways in which these developed in the immediate post-colonial period, and subsequently after the revolution and Union. It demonstrates the way in which older tensions and antagonisms were remoulded in the new situation, with a changing politico-economy and new horizontal inequalities which disadvantaged the previously advantaged groups. With multi-party democracy this became politicized not on an explicitly ethnic or racial basis but on a territorial basis. However, within Zanzibar it is clear to all that this territorial basis carried with it strong ethnic and racial resonances and this is shown, for example, in the interrelationships between adherents of the different parties in everyday life (not going to each other's weddings and funerals, boycotting businesses run by others and expressing a desire to secede). While this cultural-historical basis is hidden by the Tanzanian party system which is specifically designed to preclude ethno-territorial divisions, these divisions are evident in everyday as well as political interactions in Zanzibar. Of course this is not "ethnic" division in any simple sense: several different self-identified groups (Arabs, Shirazi, and Africans) co-exist in complex alliances, now predominantly defined in territorial terms, all speak the same language and almost all follow the same religion. But it is in this manner that "ethnic division" tends to be defined politically in other parts of Africa (see for example Langer's paper in this

volume). This paper will trace how pre-Revolution identities were given a renewed salience and formed into novel alliances during the post Revolution and post Union period through a very modern politics of distribution and within what appears on the surface as a non-ethnic party system. This is not a repetition of the previous oppositions; rather the old distinctions give added resonance to the new political arrangement. The paper argues that the Maridhiano phenomenon opened up possibilities for contenders to see opportunities to resolve the conflict without ceding too much on their identity.

GEO-HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict in Zanzibar has its origin in the long and troubled history of the Isles. Made up of Unguja and Pemba lying 40 kilometers off the coast of Tanzania with a population of a million people (of which 60% reside in Unguja: URT, 2003), Zanzibar has passed through at least three significant phases that together define, and had profound impact on, current socio-political relations and conflict. The first phase starting roughly in the 12th Century coincided with early immigration to Zanzibar by the peoples of the Persian Gulf - mainly Arabs - who established trade links with east African coastal towns, erected garrisons to defend themselves and introduced Islam to the natives (Newbury, 1983). Early immigrants freely intermarried the indigenous population; thus giving rise to a distinct coastal community.

The second phase coincided with the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th Century. The Portuguese established friendly relations with local rulers, set up trading stations and established the Christian mission, secured by Fort Jesus in Mombasa. Portugal became the first European power to gain political control of Zanzibar and subsequently retained control for almost 200 years (Newbury, 1983). Despite this lengthy period of colonization Christianity did not gain firm roots in Zanzibar or other coastal towns.

The third phase may be said to have coincided with Arab control of Zanzibar. Beginning in 1698 after they overran Fort Jesus, Arab forces ejected the Portuguese from Zanzibar and from all other coastal regions North of Mozambique (Romero, 1986). The first and second phases were politically less consequential although highly socially significant as they gave rise to a distinct identity. The third phase was characterized by immigration of peoples from across the continent. By and large socio-political relations were to radically change in the third phase of Zanzibar history. The Arab connection with Zanzibar grew to such an extent that by 1840 Seyyid Said bin Sultan al-Busaid moved his capital from Muscat to Stone Town in Unguja (Groot, 1953). Zanzibar Sultans controlled a substantial portion of the East African coast known as Zanj, and trading routes extending much further across the continent, as far as the present day Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Arabs also opened huge plantations that depended largely on slave labour and later on squatters. To pave the way for plantation most of fertile and arable land was taken from Africans; thus sowing the seeds of future socio-economic tensions. Unlike the first and second phases, the phase of Arab rule led to massive immigration of Africans from the Mainland especially along the slave routes.

Africans therefore would be brought to Zanzibar mainly as slaves to work in Zanzibar plantations.

Arab rule established extensive links with European powers - many of them already colonial powers on the Mainland—and this was reflected by the number of consulates established. In the 1890s Anglo-German rivalries already were too high to threaten the survival of the Arab rulers in Zanzibar. Indeed “all sultan successors owed their control over the throne to implicit or overt European intervention” (Newbury, 1983: 256).

British rule was established in Zanzibar in the late 1890s mainly to oversee the abolition of the slave trade and to check the spread of German influence over the East African coast. Indeed in the 1890s to counter the increasing encroachment of German power, the sultan requested the establishment of a British protectorate over Zanzibar (Newbury, 1983). With the advent of British rule a system of dual colonialism emerged in Zanzibar since the British established “Indirect rule” which assured the Sultan and Arab aristocracies a big share in the running of the new British bureaucracy.

DEMOGRAPHIC-POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN ZANZIBAR

The presence of diverse groups superimposed on exploitative economic relations coupled with an exclusive colonial political system became a source of political turmoil. The much cited population census of 1948 was the last official and systematic enumeration to carry a complete study of group identities. It indicated four principal groups including Arabs, Asians, Africans (from the mainland and indigenous) and others (including Comorians, Goans, and Europeans) (Newbury, 1983; Lofchie, 1963). The significance of the figures in Table 1 relates to the proportion of the Arab population- standing at 17%—which has remained a significant factor in socio-political relations to date. Apart from South Africa—comprising a 20% of non-African population—Zanzibar had the second largest non-African majority in Sub Saharan Africa (Lofchie, 1963).

Table 1: Ethnic/Racial composition of Zanzibar population, 1948 Census

RACE	UNGUJA		PEMBA		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
African	118,652	79.3	81,208	70.9	199,860	75.7
Arab	13,977	9.3	30,583	26.7	44,560	16.9
Indian	13,107	8.8	2,104	1.8	15,211	5.8
Comorian	2,764	1.8	503	0.4	3,267	1.1
Goan	598	0.4	83	0	681	0.3
European	256	0.2	40	0	296	0.1
Other	221	0.2	66	0	287	0.1
Total	149,575	100	114,587	100	264,162	100

Source: Lofchie (1963)

The 1948 census is a reflection of centuries of migration to Zanzibar of different ethnic groupings, which in turn were destined to occupy distinct places into a hierarchical socio-political system. Africans from the mainland arrived mainly as slaves or porters; Arabs were slave traders and aristocrats; Europeans mainly as

expatriates and later on colonialists; and Indians as traders concentrated in the urban centres in Unguja (Sheriff, 2001). As will be highlighted later in this paper, geographical factors contributed to shape identity and politics in Zanzibar. It is demonstrated, for example, in Table 1 that the relative proportions of Arabs and Africans in Pemba and Unguja are strikingly asymmetrical, with Arabs making up a quarter of the population in Pemba and less than a tenth in Unguja.

The figures and categorization in Table 1 have not remained constant. Sheriff (2001: 308), for instance, has shown that Swahili who had numbered 34,000 in 1924 had virtually disappeared by 1931 “as the label came to be seen as a pejorative term referring to people of slave origin... On the other hand, the Shirazi, as the indigenous people of Zanzibar preferred to call themselves, grew from 26,000 in 1924 to 41,000 in 1934”. The Shirazi, claiming a mixed blood from the early 12th century Shirazi from the Far East, is largely an identity invention arising out of desperation for the original inhabitants of Unguja and Pemba to differentiate themselves from recent African groups of mainland origin brought in mainly as slave labourers (Newbury, 1983). Clearly, as studies have confirmed, the slave trade and slavery left indelible marks in Zanzibar. In a mid-1980s study of the legacy of slavery, it was found that today very few people associate themselves with slavery despite the fact that at the height of the “trade” the slave population outnumbered all free people combined (Romero, 1986; Killian, 2008). As was evident in Zanzibar, the slave trade disintegrated the core African group—the largest group in the isles—who invented other identities such as “Shirazi” in order to distance themselves from the disgraces of slavery. As Tambila has observed, slavery formed part of the relations of production and resulting class conflict and class relations, though changing over time, it also informed ideological positions deriving from one’s social class (Tambila, 2001). In the “sons of soil” understanding the Shirazi gave rise to three distinct groups in Zanzibar: waTumbatu, waHadimu, and Pemba Shirazi. It is the way each of these groups allied with the minority but dominant Arab power holders and/or the African majority that determined political outcomes in the run up to independence in 1963.

The post-1964 Revolution period, however, ensured a changing political landscape commensurate with noticeable identity shifts deriving from the Africans’ acquisition of power. Killian (2008) has shown that in the early 1970s the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar issued a circular and mechanisms to enable people to change their identity. Many who had previously identified themselves as Shirazi now identified themselves as Africans. “While in 1948 about 56% of Zanzibaris identified themselves as Shirazi, only 42% said so in early 1960s and this number had declined to 20% by the early 1980s” (Killian, 2008: 106). Clearly in the post Revolution period African identity became safe and advantageous even to those who previously despised it. But interestingly, as freedom of expression increased with the advent of liberal democracy, expression of Arab and Shirazi identity started to re-emerge. For example in a 1999 survey, Killian found out that 51.3% of respondents identified themselves as “Africans”, 27.5 as “Shirazi” and 12.7% as “Arabs”.

It is important to point out that the Unguja-Pemba regional divide coincided with colonial penetration and the class relations that arose from it. By the 1830s the economy of Zanzibar was firmly in the hands of Arabs who had established large coconut and clove plantations, especially in Unguja (Sheriff, 2001; Killian, 2008). Pemba started to attract investments only when world market prices plummeted in the 1870s and extreme weather wiped out many clove plantations in Unguja (Sheriff, 2001). These events are significant in a number of ways. Firstly, the number of African immigrants from the mainland was much larger in Unguja in comparison to Pemba. Secondly, the scale of land alienation was noticeably higher in Unguja as a result of increased immigration. Thirdly, following this, the level of Arab-African antagonism was of a more intense nature in Unguja compared with Pemba. According to Sheriff (2001) Pemba attracted relatively few mainland immigrants and Arab-African/Shirazi socio-economic relations were in turn more harmonious. Since the shifting economic attention to Pemba coincided with (i) the abolition of slave trade and (ii) a global decline in price of cloves, by the time Arabs started clove farming in Pemba in the 1870s they had to rely mainly on free labour. Moreover, since they were relatively impoverished they could not establish large plantations, relying therefore on small plots maintained on a feudal basis. According to Sheriff (2001) Arabs were forced to enter into agreement with Africans whereby Africans would help in the clearing of the fields in the understanding that they would gain half the land after a predetermined period. Politically, therefore, Africans in Unguja

were struggling against Arab hegemony and wanted to restore their expropriated land and local autonomy while in Pemba the Shirazi regarded the mainlanders as enemies and foreigners accusing them of taking their jobs and promoting Christianity in a predominantly Muslim state (Killian, 2008: 105).

Groups were strongly heterogeneous and belonging to one group did not stop one from re-categorizing depending on economic circumstances. Of course there were poor Arabs much the same as there were rich Africans although this rarely affected the political alliances that were formed.

It seems reasonable to suggest that associational life is very important in holding society together. In a study of ethnic conflict and civil society in India, Varshney (2001) divided community life into associational forms and everyday engagement and observed that associational forms of engagement have a stronger impact on political relations than everyday engagement and are more prone to political manipulation than the latter. Political parties in Zanzibar, as in many parts of Africa, seem to follow this pattern. In the 1920s, largely as a response to the impact of the Great Depression on local populations, four prominent associations emerged: the Arab Association, the African Association, the Shirazi Association and Indian National Association (Sheriff, 2001). The British colonial policy encouraged intragroup solidarity and mobilization. Arabs were favored as a ruling group and have since been the main driving force in the colonial bureaucracy and policy organs. As far back as 1914 only the British, Arabs, and Indians had representation in the Protectorate Council. Even after the establishment of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) in 1926 representation remained organized in this

way (Killian, 2008). Africans of Shirazi identity were appointed for the first time into the LEGCO in 1946 signaling that the British defined the Shirazi as the indigenous Zanzibaris rather than African of Mainland origin. This led to further polarization of the African group as the Shirazi argued that generational longevity in the Islands had to be used as the primary criterion for representation (Killian, 2008).

These divisions informed political party formation in the 1950s (Campbell, 1962; Mukangara, 2000).

Africans and Shirazi (of Unguja) formed the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) in 1957; Arabs formed the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1955 and the Shirazi of Pemba splintered from the ASP to form Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) in 1959; henceforth voting in coalition with the ZNP (Mukangara, 2000). Issues of ethnicity and racial division dominated political campaigns with parties desperately struggling to win popular support. While ASP clearly stated that it stood for an African majority commensurate with an African government for Zanzibar, ZNP on the other hand advocated mechanisms to safeguard the monarchy and build an Islamic multiracial state. They accused ASP of being "alien", a thinly veiled referral to the party's support from recent immigrants from the Mainland. A religious chord was struck in the claim that if it was to be elected ASP would Christianize Zanzibar (Killian, 2008).

Four elections were organized by the British government from 1957 to 1963 and a clear pattern emerged: first, it was evident that none of the political parties could command an absolute majority to enable them to formulate a government; second, election results were highly contested, for example with six days of "bloody rioting" following the June 1961 elections (Lofchie, 1963: 186). The territorial basis of party support is clear in each of the elections: here in Table 2 we simply show the results of the July 1963 elections.

Table 2: July 1963 National Assembly Election

PARTY/COALITION	UNGUJA			PEMBA			NATIONAL TOTAL		
	VOTES	%	SEATS	VOTES	%	SEATS	VOTES	%	SEATS
ASP	53,232	63.09	11	33,853	49.39	2	87,085	54.21	13
ZNP/ ZPPP	31,144	36.91	6	42,415	55.61	12	73,559	45.79	18
ZNP	26,572	31.49	6	21,378	28.03	6	47,950	29.85	12
ZPPP	4,572	5.42		21,037	27.58	6	25,609	15.94	6
TOTAL VALID							160,644		

SOURCE: AFRICAN ELECTION DATABASE

THE ETHNO-NATIONALIST CLEAVAGES AND THE 1964 REVOLUTION

The 1964 Revolution in Zanzibar barely four weeks after independence was a symptom of sharp identity-based differentiation. ASP, who saw the 10th December 1963 independence as "Arab Independence", and believed that Arabs had conspired with the colonial rulers to deny Africans electoral victory, felt compelled to wage a revolution. The Revolution, said to have been carried by not more than 600 insurgents, targeted the ruling aristocracy including Arabs and Indians (Daly, 2009).

There was little resistance as the revolutionaries overpowered the police with traditional weapons, capturing arms and reinforcing their ranks. The sultan and members of his government fled the country. Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume was named President of the newly created People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba. Several thousand Arabs (5,000-12,000) and Indians were killed, thousands more detained or expelled, their property either confiscated or destroyed. Large landholdings were nationalized and distributed to the landless squatters in three-acre plots. Trade was made a state monopoly (Sheriff, 2001). In addition 611 homes were confiscated, many in Stone Town which was a residential area for Arabs and Indians (Killian, 2008).

After the Revolution the ASP government immediately nullified the constitution and banned all political parties except the ASP. Civil society activities were banned as well. The 10th December is never celebrated as Independence Day; rather the 12th January, the Revolution Day is celebrated in colorful annual ceremonies. The 10th December remains "independence day for Arabs". The Revolution effectively marked the end of liberal democracy and paved the way for rule by decrees of the Revolutionary Council.

The Union with Tanganyika barely three months after the revolution on 26 April 1964 has remained a subject of much speculation. It is believed that Karume never felt secure and feared retaliation from the overthrown forces that could easily regroup. Pemba for instance remained lukewarm to the Revolution. Being geographically isolated from Unguja with the largest Arab population in the Islands, it posed a genuine political threat. There were also within the ASP intragroup squabbles and radical elements that Karume needed to neutralize. This could plausibly explain the mysterious disappearance of John Okello and other left wing elements. The Union with the Mainland, which had strong historical and blood links with the Africans in Unguja, would provide much needed political relief. Many of the radical elements within the ASP were therefore either transferred to Tanganyika where they served in the Union government or were suppressed. It is also speculated that the Western bloc led by the US was worried about the connection between some elements within the new regime in Zanzibar and the Communist bloc; rumours of militant factions having received training in China, USSR and Cuba. The earliest countries to recognize Zanzibar were Communist governments; Zanzibar simultaneously offering recognition of East Germany then not recognized by countries of the Western bloc.

At the time of unification Tanganyika was already a de facto one party state, ruled by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). From 1964 until 1977 when the two parties merged, TANU remained the sole political party in the Tanzanian Mainland as it came to be known while ASP remained the party for Zanzibar. In February 1977 TANU and ASP merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) unofficially translated as the Revolutionary Party. For all practical purposes, and in relation to the critical aspect of identity, CCM claim to be the heir to ASP and custodian of the Revolution and the Union. In terms of current labeling CCM is still dubbed "a party of Mainlanders" by their main opponent, the Civic United Front (Mbunda, 2009). CUF alongside several other political parties, on the other hand,

was formed in 1992 after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania. What is striking in the Zanzibar political party system is the resurgence of the pre Revolution patterns of political support. For instance, CUF performs well in Pemba and generally in areas where ZNP and ZPPP were successful while CCM strongholds coincide with ASP's. Furthermore, CCM and CUF in turn use the past to boost popularity and damage their rival parties.

The Union complicated the Unguja-Pemba relations in several ways. First it re-affirmed the long held hypothesis (particularly in Pemba) that ASP was a party of "aliens" rather than indigenes. The legitimacy of the Union was questioned, including claims of inadequate consultation prior to the Union, structural defects, difficulties of sharing costs and benefits and an increased demand for autonomy (Killian, 2008). Indeed the Union was perpetuated through even more repression. Public debates over the form or legality of the Union were regarded as treasonous and politicians got victimized for questioning the Union. Aboud Jumbe, assuming the presidency in the aftermath of Karume's death in 1972, was forced to resign in 1984 "because of his intention to call for a Special Constitutional Court to determine the fate of Zanzibar" (Killian, 2008: 112). Four years later Seif Shariff Hamad, then Chief Minister, was also expelled from the party and forced to resign partly because of his pursuit of autonomy of Zanzibar. Killian (2008) sees this as complicating the ethno-political relations in Zanzibar. Since the establishment of the Union, another struggle has emerged; that of restoring the identity of the Zanzibar state. Demands for Zanzibar autonomy act as unifying forces for Zanzibaris, although there are also fears that the CUF preference for a three-tier loose federal structure (as opposed to the CCM two-tier structure) will make it easy for constituencies to break away.

THE SKETCH OF THE CONFLICT

The Zanzibar conflict reflects what Todd (2005: 93) describes as an "extreme case where the state is simply the instrument of the dominant community, its interests constituted by community interests—an 'ethnic state'". Indeed in Zanzibar the dominant group has been using state resources to secure and reproduce its own dominance and to exclude the dominated group. The Revolution was poised to affect Pemba negatively given the kinds of political and economic policies that the government adopted. As Sheriff argued "by declaring Zanzibar a one-party state and banning the overthrown political parties, the revolution essentially disenfranchised nearly half the population" (Sheriff, 2001: 315). Some examples follow to help explain why Pemba started to feel a sense of alienation which slowly pushed it to seek a separate collective identity. An opportunity to wage a struggle for its reclamation emerged following the re-introduction of multi-party politics.

Primarily in Pemba, political and economic inequalities go together and actually reinforce each other. People of Pemba enjoy fewer benefits from the state than fellow Ungujans. All of the six presidents and many of the chief ministers in Zanzibar for over four decades came from Unguja. In a country that is regionally divided this created a powerful sense of alienation. The fact is that only after the Reconciliation of 2010 (Maridhiano)—to be detailed later—did Pemba produce a

president. Seif Sharif Hamad, the only Chief Minister from Pemba, who appeared set to become president, was suddenly dropped from the cabinet in 1988, expelled from CCM and detained for 30 months based upon accusations of tampering with the Union (Killian, 2008). (Hamad is now first vice president in the Government of National Unity that was formed after Maridhiano.) Since the cabinet used to be drawn from the winning party, Pemba ended up with very few cabinet posts. The following extract from an interview with Nassor, a resident in Pemba, captures the feeling of the common people in Pemba....“the infrastructure here is so poor, unemployment rate is higher than in Unguja....and despite its size and population, the entire island has only two ministers in the government...this is unfair” (Daily News, 26th May 2010). Similarly, the feeling is that Pembans are excluded in other government posts: CUF maintains that in the previous government (in power from 2000 to 2010) Pemba had less than 20 percent of the bureaucratic posts in the government (Mbunda, 2009).

Pemba is also visibly marginalized economically. The general state of infrastructure (roads, electricity supply, tourist hotels, fast ferries, number of air flights) is poorly developed in Pemba compared to Unguja. Tourists fly directly via Zanzibar international airport to Unguja and stay in numerous luxurious beach hotels. Tourists rarely visit Pemba and many who visit “have been shocked by obvious signs of malnutrition among children” (Sheriff, 2001: 315).

Relatedly, the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of 2004 revealed that of the 94 industrial establishments in Zanzibar, only 15 were located in Pemba. Many of them had less impact economically as they were small scale with 9 employing less than 10 people and only 3 employed between 50-99 people. The rest of the industrial establishments were located in Unguja with 3 alone employing up to 500 people. The HBS established consumption per member of household to find out poverty levels in Zanzibar. The results indicated that 13% of people in Zanzibar lived below the poverty line, with a further 49% unable to meet their basic needs. The survey also uncovered the rural/urban dichotomy in the incidence of poverty with rural areas having a much higher rate than urban areas. Since Pemba is still heavily rural in comparison to Unguja, this disproportionately affects Pemba. The HBS found that while the total percentage of the population of Unguja considered poor amounted to 10%, in Pemba the figure was more than 20%.

As a major world producer of cloves (70% of global output), Pemba has been dissatisfied with the way the Zanzibar government handles the economy and complained about the government’s exploitative monopoly over the clove market, at times offering 50% less than world market prices (Pottie, 2002), or in the worst cases as in 1978 only 7% (Sheriff, 2001). The Zanzibar government’s Special Forces KMKM (coastguards) ensure that cloves are not smuggled to nearby Kenya where prices are far better (Sheriff, 2001). Moreover, smugglers are treated with a heavy hand. While Pemba generates a large share of the national income, a large part of it is claimed to be benefiting Unguja.

This forms the basis for the recurrent violence surrounding elections in Zanzibar. Four general elections have been conducted in Tanzania since independence and

the trend is surprisingly similar to that of the 1957-1963 elections in Zanzibar. The bottom line has been the apparent fear of the Revolutionary government to lose power as “this government came about through struggle and blood and will not be let away through a piece of paper”.¹ As correctly argued by Cameron, CCM leaders and many people in Unguja think that CUF will return the Omani Sultanate, associating CUF with the pre-Revolutionary ZNP which was overthrown by ASP. A speech by the first lady at the meeting in Pemba epitomized the CCM’s campaign:

opposition leaders dreaming of a return to the pre-Revolutionary regime...before the 1964 Revolution the people of the Isles were slaves in their own country...I call upon you to be more analytical before you support parties with hidden agendas aiming at humiliating your dignity as independent people (Cameron, 2002: 316).

CUF on the other hand feels that its rightful democratic victory was deliberately denied.

Table 4 and 5 below indicate the closeness of political competition in Zanzibar and reveal a yawning gap in the current winner-take-all electoral system. In the presidential elections, for instance, the difference between the winner and loser is just a fraction of a percentage.² The 1995 elections were held amidst claims for more meaningful reforms including a new constitution and reformulation of the electoral commission. CCM won narrowly the presidential seat in an election that was full of fraudulent practices, and won 50.2% of popular votes in the House of Representatives. CUF refused to recognize the government and boycotted all sessions of the House of Representatives. Hamad declared himself the rightful elected president of Zanzibar. The CCM government responded by arresting 18 CUF followers keeping them in custody without in what was coined “treason trial”.

Table 3: Elections for Zanzibar House of Representatives (1995-2010)

YEAR	PARTY	UNGUJA			PEMBA		
		Votes	% of votes	Seats	Votes	% of votes	Seats
1995	CCM	134,399	86.1	26	21,632	13.9	-
	CUF	40,212	25.5	3	118,716	74.7	21
2000	CCM						
	CUF						
2005	CCM	203,713	89.7	31	23,346	10.3	-
	CUF	82,117	41.5	1	115,693	58.5	18
2010	CCM			22			-
	CUF			4			18

SOURCE: KILLIAN, 2008; ZEC ELECTION REPORT 2010

In the 2000 elections CCM had a new presidential candidate, Amani Karume, who had to contest with Seif Sharif Hamad who was running for the second time having been contentiously defeated in 1995. Karume gained more popular votes than his predecessor (67% of the popular vote cast) in an election that was again full of controversy and recriminations, and described as being even more corrupt and rigged than those in 1995. Initial demonstrations, explosions and boycotts were followed by nation-wide demonstrations. Tensions came to head on 27 January 2001 when the police clashed with angry demonstrators in Pemba, shot live

ammunition randomly at the crowd and in the fracas killed over 27 demonstrators (AI, 2001).³ Violence also followed the 2005 election.

Table 4: Zanzibar Presidential Election Results (1995-2010)

ELECTION YEAR	PARTY	TOTAL VOTES	%	%UNGUJA	%PEMBA
1995	CCM	165,271	50.2	87.4	12.6
	CUF	163,706	49.8	39.0	61.0
2000	CCM	248,095	67.0	-	-
	CUF	122,000	33.0	-	-
2005	CCM	239,832	53.2	90.6	9.4
	CUF	207,773	46.1	42.0	58.0
2010	CCM	179,809	50.1	63.9	18.2
	CUF	176,338	49.1	33.4	80.1

SOURCE: KILLIAN, 2008; ZEC ELECTION REPORT 2010

Many writers have attributed the conflict to electoral competition (for example, Mpangala (2006)). However this is to miss the dynamics of the conflict, especially the identity of the main contenders and their associated interests (see also Mbunda, (2010) pp 60-69). It is generally understood that CCM represents ASP. CUF on the other hand is branded by CCM and pro-Revolutionaries to be “Arab” party representing the forces overthrown in the 1964 Revolution.

THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 1995-2010: ACHIEVEMENTS AND DRAWBACKS

The likelihood of resolving a conflict depends on its level of intensity and the extent to which underlying issues have been identified and addressed before agreement is reached. If issues are neglected, they can grow into more serious grievances that predispose towards violence (Fisher, et al, 2000). Zanzibar’s peace process has been a protracted affair, dealing sequentially with different layers of issues and grievances. The Commonwealth mediation after the 1995 election is the only direct international involvement in the conflict. This apart, the contending parties have also attempted to settle their differences through “inter party” negotiations immediately after the elections of 2000 and 2005. The Commonwealth mediation led to the first Agreement (first Muafaka, 1999); the interparty negotiations came with the Second Muafaka in 2001. However, although the two agreements eased the tensions to some extent, they were not able to bring resolution because they neglected the underlying issues in conflict.

The Commonwealth-brokered first Muafaka in June 1999 promised major structural and policy reforms including commitment by both parties to

work together in the spirit of national reconciliation to consolidate democracy in Zanzibar, promote human rights and good governance and ensure that the elections scheduled for the year 2000 and all other subsequent elections were free of controversy and in which the will of the electorate will be respected (Amnesty International, 2000).

In short the first Muafaka was wide ranging, containing 15 items that included aspects of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), the constitution, the judiciary, the electoral laws, the state media organs, a permanent voters' register, the freedom of political parties, civic education, attendance in the House of Representatives, promotion of good governance and democratization (the East African, in Mpangala, 2006). The agreement contained provisions for finding an independent assessor to examine claims of destruction of property, unfair dismissals from government employment, the withdrawals of student scholarships and provisions to allow allegations of human rights abuses to be taken to the courts. By the October 2000 election - which was supposed to be the benchmark for implementation of this agreement - not only had the agreement not been implemented, but the human rights situation was deteriorating. The 18 "prisoners of conscience", as Amnesty International came to refer to the CUF leaders who were arrested on Amour's order for alleged "treason" trial, were still languishing in jail.

In 2001, after the violence of January, the contending parties reached another agreement known as Muafaka II. Although Mpangala (2006) notes that over 90 per cent of Muafaka II has been implemented, including establishment of the permanent voters' register ahead of the 2005 elections, amendment of electoral laws and restructuring of the ZEC, he still sees it as short of resolving the conflict. In significant ways, these measures left intact the identity questions. Mpangala (2006: 70) observes that... "even if Muafaka II has been fully implemented, it is still not enough to ensure durable peace. This is because the Muafaka has been concerned mainly with election issues". Pro-revolutionaries were concerned that CCM was conceding too much to CUF's demands, while CUF boycotted the voter registration exercise ahead of the 2010 elections because of what it claimed as deliberate efforts to deny its supporters opportunity to register and thereafter to vote. Only Maridhiano abated another burst of violence at the end of the 2010 elections.

MARIDHIANO 2010 : RESOLVING THE CONFLICT ?

Inter party negotiations recommenced immediately after the 2005 elections and were stalled in 2008 when CCM decided that Zanzibaris should decide, through a referendum whether or not they wanted a Government of National Unity. CUF claimed that CCM had invented this requirement to derail the peace process and withdrew from the talks. When failure seemed assured, Karume invited Hamad to the state house on 5 November 2009 to discuss the fate of peace in Zanzibar, bypassing CCM formal structures and surprising many analysts of Zanzibar politics.

This move earned Karume two crucial credits. First he was seen as a new beacon of hope in Zanzibar. Secondly, and most importantly, he was asserting Zanzibar's identity by showing its autonomy to deal with its own affairs. It was widely perceived that the inter party negotiations were driven by the Mainland: the fact that final decisions had to be endorsed by CCM Mainland (whose interests did not necessarily coincide even with CCM Zanzibar) irritated a considerable constituency in Zanzibar. Since Karume's move, the negotiations have remained within the domain of Zanzibar and are no longer decided by any Union structure either of the

party or the government. Immediately after the talks the leader of the opposition camp in the House of Representatives Abubakar Khamis Bakari tabled a private motion to “support” the talks in February 2010 and called for formation of Government of National Unity (GNU). The House passed the motion. Two weeks later the Attorney General drafted a bill to allow for a referendum on power sharing be ready for tabling in the next session of the House of Representatives in March 2010. The bill was passed by majority vote.

In July 2010 a majority (67%) voted in favour of the GNU in a referendum.⁴ The results reverse the usual patterns.⁵ Rather than Pemba disapproving of the government and Unguja approving, Pemba highly approved the decision to form the GNU, while Unguja largely disapproved. The “Yes” vote in Pemba was in the region of over 80% while in Unguja it was in the region of 50-55%. It appears that Ungujans felt that they were losing by entering the GNU while Pembans felt the opposite.

The agreement provides that the government formed after the 2010 election in October will include CUF and CCM in a power sharing arrangement. The formula is straightforward. The winning party produces the president while the runner up produces the first vice president. The second vice president comes from the president’s party and becomes the leader of government business in the House of Representatives (HoR). Cabinet posts are distributed in proportion to the number of elected seats each party obtained from the election. In the 2010 election held on the 31st October 2010 CCM’s presidential candidate came first winning 51.1% of popular votes while CUF’s presidential candidate came second with 49.1% of popular vote. Accordingly following the 10th amendment to the Zanzibar constitution, the CCM’s candidate is now the president; while CUF has produced the first vice president. With 22 of the 50 seats in the HoR CUF got 10 cabinet posts while CCM got 15. While there are general complaints that a cabinet of 25 is considerably inflated for a population of 1 million, this is an opportunity cost of a power sharing government built on consociational principles.

The conduct of the referendum of 31 July 2010 was revealing. CCM and CUF already supported the proposal and were simply trying to mobilize popular support. In contrast to the Kenyan referendum held only a few days before, there was no open campaign in Zanzibar. The government explained that this would politicize the process and that the people should decide without any undue interference from the political parties. Some civil society organisations got funding from UNDP to conduct voter education for barely four weeks but for the most part this simply encouraged people to go out to vote “Yes”. The president used various occasions to talk about the GNU, arguing that there was a need to break new ground for peace in Zanzibar and therefore people should vote “Yes”. It was portrayed as if the GNU was the only way forward for Zanzibar. Indeed, Karume fired one of the Regional Commissioners in Unguja, who was thought to have been conducting a clandestine campaign against the government of National Unity. This drove further underground any “No” campaigners while giving the Yes camp in CCM and CUF a free ground to campaign.

The critical question is why power sharing was accepted in 2010 while it has been floated since 1995 and consistently refused by the dominant CCM? Power sharing is no longer a novel strategy to resolve conflicts in deeply divided society but it places a lot of demands on the current regime to compromise (Bergi, 2008). It is likely that political developments within the region had an impact on the Zanzibar conflict. Recent examples of power-sharing in the last three years include Zimbabwe⁶ and Kenya.

While it might not be realistic at this early stage to make a thorough assessment of the success of Maridhiano, a few remarks are in order. Firstly, Maridhiano laid down a framework for addressing the recurring Zanzibar conflict, drawing from previous agreements (Muafaka I and II). And, surely as a result of Maridhiano the 2010 elections in Zanzibar were unusually peaceful. Yet, like previous agreements, Maridhiano does not sufficiently address structural inequalities, nor does it have any strategic plan for that. Muafaka II had gone some distance to at least identify some of these inequalities and had a provision that called for review of recruitment policy and practices. Even then there were no specific mechanisms or strategies to realize this goal. Maridhiano has addressed the political problem of exclusion, and does not seem to have a systematic programme to address the economic problem.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to contextualize the politics of identities and how it impinges on conflict resolution in Zanzibar. While the Zanzibar conflict is not comparable in the extent of violence to other conflicts across the continent, it has most of the characteristics of a protracted and deep-seated ethnic conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ ethnic divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities. The 1964 Revolution simply shifted the power balances but left the boundaries intact. It is hardly surprising therefore that after four decades of policies that purported to erase ethnic and racial politics, once multiparty elections commenced, old boundaries resurfaced even more pronouncedly.

While logically power-sharing might have been the most appropriate form of government, strong historical memories have kept “African” majority and “Arab” minority apart. The identity question is complicated since in Zanzibar it is not simply the identity of individuals that is at stake but also the identity of the state. The short-lived pre-Revolution government identified itself as an “Arab” state and its bid to “Arabize” the bureaucracy and the security forces considerably undermined its own defence and paved the way for the easy capture of government by “African” revolutionaries. After the 1964 Union, the autonomous status of Zanzibar has remained in question. Herein lies a puzzle—on the one hand the question of identity acts as a strong divisive force in Zanzibar while on the other it acts as force of unity. The current peace settlement therefore symbolizes the struggle both for individuals in Zanzibar to reclaim their identity and with it a fair share of power while at the same time searching for the lost glory of the state of Zanzibar.

This hypothesis explains why Maridhiano worked in 2010 whereas the first and second Muafaka failed. While the first and second Muafaka had a strong Mainland hand, Maridhiano, more than any other previous peace processes, offered an opportunity for Zanzibar to reassert its autonomy, however symbolic and nominal this might seem. It is clear that the agreement was skilfully crafted such that CCM does not lose much in terms of its identity. Despite CUF's repudiation of the Revolution, the Revolutionary Government and the Revolutionary Council—powerful identity symbols in Zanzibar—these remain intact. In short CUF has been simply invited to serve in the Revolutionary Government. CUF on its part has taken a very difficult step: it has taken Pemba back into the political map of Zanzibar.

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¹This was a message that was anonymously circulated during the 1995 election.

²Elections on the Tanzanian Mainland and Zanzibar are usually held on the same day. In Zanzibar, however, in addition to the Union President and Members of the Union Parliament, voters elect the Zanzibar president, members of House of Representatives and local councillors. The HoR has 50 elected members.

³ A joint fact finding report by the International Federation for Human Rights and the Legal and Human Rights Centre found out that altogether 65 people were killed in the whole of Zanzibar on 26th and 27th January 2001.

⁴The referendum question asked roughly translated was: ‘Do you agree that a new form of government will be instituted after the general election of 2010?’

⁵The author of this paper spent four weeks in Pemba as part of a local observer team, Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO). Much of the information in this section is a result of direct observation of the process leading to the referendum.

⁶ Power sharing in Zimbabwe is perhaps the most skewed of the examples given here. In Zimbabwe the ruling party, ZANU-PF retains control of most of the real power especially the police and the military.